THE SPEAKER: Now with regard to the course of the discussions we will act on that arrangement that I announced to you earlier, that is those who wish to speak will give in their names to any one of the four Whips and we will then have the discussion in order. They will pass on the names to me and it will be arranged different members of Dáil will speak.

MR. ERSKINE CHILDERS: I wish to appeal to the Dáil for a very close, earnest and dispassionate consideration of the terms of the document, which the President has laid before you, with a full sense of the importance attaching to it and the possibility that unity may be reached upon it, and with the fact that the future of Ireland for generations to come may depend upon the choice given by this assembly between the proposals laid down in that document and the terms of the Treaty signed in London. I do not think so far from the speeches that have been delivered to you that close and dispassionate consideration has been given. Of course the time has been short. It has only been before you for a short time. Nevertheless it seemed to me that there were certain judgements passed upon the President's document which were [gap in original] and ill-considered, and delivered without full cognizance of the immense importance attaching to it. It has been said by more than one speaker that broadly speaking there is no difference between the document presented to you by the President and the Treaty as signed in London— broadly speaking I say. At any rate the opinion has been expressed that the difference between the two documents was not appreciable enough to influence the action of the nation at this grave moment of crisis. I ask for a reconsideration of that judgment and for a close discussion of the terms of the document before you. I shall endeavour to prove to you that, so far from the being the same document or approximately the same document as the Treaty signed in London, it is a document differing in vital and fundamental respects from the Treaty signed in London. And in saying that I should like to say two other things. The first I think I can say justly as having been secretary of the delegation in London. I think I am entitled—and I think the other members of the delegation will think I am entitled—to make this general statement. This document of the President is founded on proposals made to the British government in London. It is founded on that. In no fundamental respect does it differ from them. Now I am correct in saying that, throughout the proceedings in London, no suggestion was heard from the Irish side or from the British side that the terms of such proposals—I am referring now to the proposals made in London upon which I again [163] say the President's are founded—did not differ vitally and fundamentally from the British proposals. They differed in this respect—and both sides knew and said they differed in this respect—that the British proposals left the King of England King of Ireland and Ireland within the British Empire; and that the Irish proposals took away from the King of England, and therefore—it is extremely important—from the British nation authority over Ireland and placed Ireland outside the British Empire. These points were perfectly clearly understood. And here in Dublin when the point is raised that these two documents do not vitally differ, I venture to say that those who would press that opinion have not studied them closely themselves, and I venture to say this further that all the delegates in London will substantiate what I am saying and tell you that they differed vitally. There is a further point. The opinion has been expressed here that if you don't take the President's proposals you might as well go back to the bare unqualified form of a Republic. We will express it in that form— an independent Republic, an isolated Republic and no more. I ask the Assembly to remember this, and every member of it knows that the delegation was sent to London with an expressed intention. It was sent there under the terms of the letters which were passed, and of one letter in particular which the Dáil itself was solid on, to which it gave its unanimous assent so that they should go to London to consider and discuss how an association could be formed with the British Commonwealth which would satisfy national aspirations. There was no question under the terms before the Dáil, or before the delegation, of an absolutely isolated Republic. The question was, could terms be obtained in London which would satisfy that formula and meet the national aspirations of Ireland—that is to say, could the national independence be maintained and an association formed with the British Commonwealth satisfactory both to Ireland and to that Commonwealth? That was the issue. Now this document submitted to you by the President appears to me to be a faithful and truthful presentation of a means of carrying out that undertaking and of associating Ireland—retaining her freedom as Ireland —with the British Commonwealth in all matters in which the British Commonwealth and Ireland could jointly act in cooperation. Now I call your attention— your very earnest attention—to clause I of the President's document: “That the legislative, executive, and judicial authority of Ireland shall be derived solely from the people of Ireland”. That clause represents that side of the undertaking to which I have just called your attention in which the national aspirations of Ireland are referred to. That clause confers or rather recognises—and in our view it is a case of recognition—the independence of Ireland, and I defy anyone, constitutional lawyer or humble layman, man in the street or whoever it is, to pick a hole in that definition of independence. There are two ways of expressing independence of course. On the one hand a power which claims authority over another can renounce its authority over that other. The other way of reaching the same result is for the nation which has been under the authority of the other to declare its independence. This clause takes a later [recte the latter] form. I was amazed to hear you, Sir (the Speaker), in your capacity as a member of the Dáil speaking just now, referring to that clause in a very light and casual manner, as it seemed to me, and saying, I think, that it was a clause which should appear in an Irish Constitution and should not appear in an agreement with Great Britain. I confess I am altogether unable to understand that way of presenting the case. For 750 years, whether we like it or not, England has exercised authority over this island. There is no getting away from it, and when Ireland is making an agreement with Great Britain, an agreement to obtain her freedom simultaneously with an association with Great Britain, there surely must be some declaration of independence in that document apart altogether from the Constitution which Ireland proposes subsequently to set up. There must be an expressed statement somewhere that Irish authority belongs to Ireland and that the King of England's authority does not run in Ireland. And that is contained in Clause I of the President's document. Under the British law the King holds—and under the Treaty will still continue to hold— legislative, executive and judicial authority in Ireland. In Clause I of the President's document he does not hold, and Ireland and the Irish people alone hold. You have to contrast that first [164] clause with the second clause of the British Treaty: “Subject to the provisions hereinafter set out the position of the Irish Free State in relation to the Imperial Parliament and Government and otherwise shall be that of the Dominion of Canada”—now—“and the law, practice and constitutional usage governing the relationship of the Crown and of the Imperial Parliament to the Dominion of Canada shall govern their relationship to the Irish Free State”. That is the clause you have to compare with the one I have just read to you. Nobody could be in any two minds about the difference between the two, lawyer or layman, I should think. Nobody should leave this Assembly without having made his mind up clearly on the subject and seeing the significance attaching to it. Under the law which runs in Canada the King of England will be King of Ireland and British authority which stands behind the King of England will be British authority in Ireland. Never forget to associate these two things together. The King, a constitutional King, has in fact very few functions having power but he acts through a ministry which does wield power. Wherever you see a King of England acting anywhere throughout his dominions behind him lies the British authority. The King in Ireland will be part of the legislature in Ireland. I am referring now to the legislative function. The Parliament of Canada consists of the King and the two Houses of Parliament and the King exercises functions in that Parliament. He exercises a very important function of giving assent to Canadian Acts of Parliament. He exercises that function through the Governor General who is in Canada as the representative of the King and who in all matters where King's authority is concerned represents the King. Before I leave the legislature, the King or rather, in this respect, British authority has another important power in Canada. The Imperial Parliament sitting at West-minister of which again the King is part; the King, Lords and Commons, can pass legislature [recte legislation], can pass laws of its own in London and by law—mind you I am not going to be unfair for a moment—which, by law, can bind Canada. There is no question of that. The liberties and laws passed by the British Parliament in the past have bound Canada and applied to Canada to this day. The same constitution by law would apply to Ireland, namely, that Acts of the British Parliament could by law bind Ireland without Ireland's assent, and without Ireland's knowledge even of they having been passed. That is in addition to the royal power to give assent to the Acts of the Canadian Parliament, which would be transferred in the case of Ireland, giving assent, through his Governor General or representatives or whatever he may be called, to Acts of the Irish Parliament. The King has also an executive capacity. I would call your attention to the second of the President's clauses, “executive”. Under the law all executive authority in Canada belongs to the King of England. All executive acts are done in his name by whomsoever so performed. Here again, the Governor General acts for the King, and in Ireland whoever takes the place of the Governor General, or whatever he is called, will act for the King of England. Under the Act of Parliament—and I might remind you here that the liberties of Canada, the constitution of Canada, and what is called the position of Canada in this Treaty are regulated by an Act of the British Parliament— and in my opinion the British government, if this Treaty were to be carried out, would endeavour to place the position of Ireland under a similar authority, namely an Act of the British Parliament. The Governor General acting by authority of the King has appointed [sic]. It is bound to ask his advice and consult him; but he is not bound by law to anything and is not bound by law even to ask it, only in certain cases, as for example the dissolution of Parliament and appointment of Ministers and some other matters. That is the law. Every executive act in Canada is done under the authority of the King and every executive act in Ireland of the Irish Government would be done legally under the authority of the King of England. I call your attention next to the word “judicial” in the first line of the President's draft. Under the President's address all judicial authority like all executive and legislative authority would be derived solely from the Irish people. That is not so in the case of Canada. There is a judicial link between Canada and Great Britain in the form of an appeal from the highest of the Canadian courts to the Privy Council of England, a body called the judicial committee of the Privy Council. That exists in the case of Canada and of Great Britain. I am not laying particular stress on it but I have to call [165] your attention to the terms of this document and to show you what is meant by that word “law” in the British Treaty. As regards the army, in Canada the King of England is Commander-in-Chief of all Canadian forces and with the same law, carried out under the Treaty in Ireland, the King of England would be Commander-in-Chief of all Irish forces. The question of military and naval defence. Now under the law in Canada, and I again remind you that I am later going to speak on what is called “constitutional usage”, the power of the King of England and therefore of the British government are practically supreme over Canadians. They can undoubtedly under the law conscript Canadians. They can conduct a military occupation of Canada and use the resources of Canada over any country in which they are engaged at war and they can implicate Canada by law in any such war. Every possibility of that kind is ruled out by this document of the President. In that connection I shall have to refer to later clauses of it but this is relevant in connection with the first clause because that states, “that the legislative, executive and judicial authority of Ireland shall be derived solely from the people of Ireland.” We shall come later to the method of association with the British Empire. I must draw your attention now, because they are directly relevant to the matter I am discussing, to the clauses 6 and 7 of the Treaty referring to this matter of defence to which I have just alluded. It would be easier if you would turn your attention first to clause No. 7, “The Government of the Irish Free State shall afford to His Majesty's Imperial forces:—

(a) In time of peace such harbour and other facilities as are indicated in the Annex hereto, or such other facilities as may from time to time be agreed between the British Government and the Government of the Irish Free State.

(b) In time of war or of strained relations with a Foreign Power such harbour and other facilities as the British Government may require for the purposes of such defence as aforesaid.”

That clause gives the British government a permanent army of occupation in certain parts of Ireland referred to in the Treaty. And apart altogether from that it must be understood from the provision in section 2 which refers to “constitutional usage”. That will clearly be understood from the terms of the Treaty. Clauses 6 and 7 are exceptions to Dominion Status—a permanent army of occupation at Irish ports and (a) permanent implication in British war waged for whatever object or purpose because under this clause, “In time of peace such harbour and other facilities as are indicated in the Annex hereto or such other facilities as may from time to time be agreed between the British Government and the Government of the Irish Free State and (b) in time of war or of strained relations with a Foreign Power such harbour and other facilities as the British Government may require for the purposes of such defence as aforesaid.” That indicates that not only the ports referred to in the Annex but any docks or facilities of any sort whatsoever throughout the whole island will be at the disposal of the British government. And if the ports and facilities of an island are under the disposal of a government at war that island obviously and necessarily is engaged in that war whether it likes it or not. The provisions of that clause are permanent and are not affected by any qualification of the constitutional status. I am referring now to the corresponding clauses under the President's draft, numbers 7, 8, 9. I should have referred, before I pass to that, to clause 6 of the Treaty. Clause 6 says: “Until an arrangement has been made between the British and Irish Governments whereby the Irish Free State undertakes her own coastal defence, the defence by sea of Great Britain and Ireland shall be undertaken by His Majesty's Imperial Forces, but this shall not prevent the construction or maintenance by the Government of the Irish Free State of such vessels as are necessary for the protection of the Revenue or the Fisheries”. Now I think it should be understood exactly what the meaning of that clause is and why it is separated from the other one. Substantially it means nothing legally as a binding undertaking more than is contained in the original proposals of July 20th in a certain clause there which stated that the Royal Navy was to have exclusive control over the coasts and seas of Ireland. “Until an arrangement has been made between the British and Irish Governments”—no arrangement ever could be made without [166] the agreement of the British government. The only qualification is that Ireland may construct and maintain such vessels as are necessary for the fisheries. Those of course are not defence vessels, properly speaking they are not part of the Navy at all. In that paragraph is contained a prohibition of Ireland from having a naval defence force—naval ships I should say— of her own because [of] the sense and meaning of the clause referring to ships. The latter part of the paragraph says: “The foregoing provisions of this article shall be reviewed at a conference of Representatives of the British and Irish Governments to be held at the expiration of five years from the date hereof with a view to the undertaking by Ireland of a share in her own coastal defence”. That commits the British government to nothing whatever and, if there was any result, it would only give Ireland a share in her own coastal defence. Turn to clauses 7, 8 and 9 of the President's draft. It ought to be clear to everyone here that national independence is impossible in the true sense unless the right of Ireland to defend herself, her own coasts and her own shores is admitted. If that right is not admitted no number of treaties or agreements or stipulations can get over the fact that Ireland is restrained from expressing one of the fundamental and essential functions of an independent government. To say that we cannot construct a navy is to make it a protectorate of the country which issues that order. Clause number 7 of the President's draft states the true principle—the principle that every independent nation in the world makes and must make whether it is stated on paper or not, “that, so far as her resources permit, Ireland shall provide for her own defence by sea, land and air”. And the latter part gives the further undertaking, “and shall repel by force any attempt by a foreign power to violate the integrity of her soil and territorial waters, or to use them for any purpose hostile to Great Britain and the other associated States”. That is meant to give a security to Great Britain and at the same time it expresses a duty and responsibility on the part of Ireland. No such clause appears in the Treaty as signed, and in substitution for that clause appears paragraph No. 6 in the Treaty prohibiting an Irish navy. Clause No. 8 in the President's draft makes some qualifications. There is not the slightest doubt in negotiating with England it had to be made and has to be made. They feel tremendously on the subject of defence and the question before any one negotiating with them would be to meet them in that respect, to meet them without sacrificing the national status and without formally giving up what is the fundamental right of every free nation. Clauses 8 and 9 carry out that principle, it seems to me, as well as can be carried out. They say, “That for five years pending the establishment of Irish coastal defence forces, or for such other period as the Governments of the two countries may later agree upon, facilities for the Coastal—”. “Or for such other period as the Governments of the two countries may later agree upon”— that is to say there must be an agreement to change that—“facilities for the coastal defence of Ireland shall be given to the British Government as follows”. Both those paragraphs are taken almost entirely from the British Treaty, as you will observe, and they are covered by a five years condition in the first part of the paragraph. And the purpose of that is explained clearly on the face of the document, “pending the establishment of Irish coastal defence forces”—that is a very national qualification because no such thing exists now in the meaning intended, that is the naval sense. The army actually does exist but no naval defence exists at this moment, so that it is a national condition to be thought of in these arrangements that, within a certain time, when Ireland has had time to prepare her own coastal defence force—that time 5 years is a fairly reasonable time, rather a long time in my opinion, but by a period laid down—and that, at the end of five years, British authority in these matters would end and Irish authority would be paramount. No. 9 provides for a representative conference to fulfil that final handing over of the defences from one government to another. It makes it perfectly clear. I think this point was rather lightly made by the Speaker—I think it was you yourself, Sir. I think it is perfectly clear that the function of that conference is to hand over the coastal defence of Ireland to the Irish Government in default of some other arrangement arrived at by agreement. It leaves the hands of Ireland perfectly clear. If it is not clear that at the end of five years they must hand over those defences and [sic] [167] nothing could be easier than to find other words making it clear, but in my opinion it is clear from that. That is the contrast to be drawn between the President's draft and the draft Treaty. There is one other point to be noted. The President's draft No. 10 contains an additional paragraph with regard to the naval defence. It says, “That in order to co-operate in furthering the principle of international limitation of armaments, the Government of Ireland shall not

(a) build submarines unless by agreement with Great Britain.”

168 169

That appears to me to be a useful provision and I am glad it was added. Any free nation has a perfect right to make that arrangement with another nation, nor is its status appreciably qualified thereby. Only the other day at Washington an agreement was proposed for the elimination of submarines altogether in view of their use in modern war. Ireland sacrifices nothing in the way of status by that simple declaration that, unless by agreement with Great Britain and the other States of the Commonwealth, Ireland will not build submarines, a particular class of naval craft. The last paragraph of the same clause refers to military defence and says that Ireland shall not, “maintain a military defence force, the establishments whereof exceed in size such proportion of the military establishments maintained in Great Britain as that which the population of Ireland bears to the population of Great Britain”. Only the other day at Washington an agreement was come to between several powers of a very similar character —that is to say a mutual agreement to limit their naval forces in certain definite proportions, one to the other, 60 per cent, 80 per cent and so on. I need not say, and I don't suggest anybody need say who is a Republican that provisions like this would not be disliked [sic] if the matter could be avoided altogether. I don't suppose anyone would say that they prefer to have any such provision of that kind in a Treaty with another power if they could avoid it. But this is a worthy fact that in the making of an arrangement of this kind the effort must be in negotiation to go as far as you can to meet your adversary without sacrificing in any essential particular your own national position. That is the time to give in. This defence clause of the President which I hold in my hand will succeed and if it does not succeed it should be pointed out clearly what the resources are. Similarly I should say clauses 6 and 7, the defence clauses, of the Treaty as signed in London do absolutely annihilate Ireland's rights in this vital matter of defence providing for a permanent occupation of Irish shores and for a vital prohibition of an Irish navy. I have had to enlarge somewhat upon that defence matter and proceed into a latter clause necessarily [more] than I should naturally have done if I had taken the document through because they arise from a consideration of the executive power in Ireland as it would be held under the President's draft and the executive power in Ireland as it would be held under the Treaty signed in London. In that respect as I have pointed out before there is no question of the constitution status of Canada and I would like to repeat it again. In these respects the constitutional status of Canada is ruled out. There are exceptions to that rule and therefore the King's authority and the executive authority of Great Britain remain absolutely permanent. Now about that word “Constitutional” in paragraph 2 of the Treaty, subject to the provisions hereinafter set out the position of the Irish State in relation to the Imperial Parliament and Government and otherwise shall be that of the Dominion of Canada, and the law, practice and constitutional usage governing the relationship of the Crown and of the Imperial Parliament to the Dominion of Canada shall govern their relationship to the Irish Free State”. “Constitutional usage”, “constitutional practice”—the word “practice” I don't know the meaning of it at all. “Constitutional usage” is fairly well understood. I suppose the best construction to be put upon the Treaty is that the law, as I have described it to you as existing in Canada, and the law, as I have described it to you as it will unquestionably exist in Ireland, are in a certain sense abolished or qualified doubly by the use of the word “constitutional usage” in this sense, that as everybody knows—I suppose at least everybody knows—the Dominion of Canada and the other Dominions of the British Crown have in the course of their recent history acquired a very large measure of liberty. That is not putting it strong enough. They have acquired, I am perfectly willing to say, a virtual independence of Great Britain not [168] under the law for the law remains precisely the same. By law the subordinate dependencies of the British Crown hold their power under Acts of the British Parliament. That law remains the same but by constitutional usage they have escaped from the letter of that law and, in my opinion, based on a close study of modern development, they have escaped from it to the extent that they are virtually independent nations, exercising full executive rights of their own within these borders, full legislative rights, and in vital matters like peace and war, treaties and so on, have obtained a position in which they can make their voices heard to such extent as to influence Imperial policy. Further than that—and this is not a matter of demonstration at all, this is merely a matter of opinion—that they have practically reached a point at which, as Mr. Bonar Law I think pointed out, if they differed in any vital matter from Great Britain—in a matter of policy —could secede from the British Empire. I don't think it is at all too strong to say that. At any rate in these matters I have been stressing, as regards the law in Ireland, questions of fact —the Canadian Acts by the Crown in the person of the Governor General is in the ordinary normal course of things given on the advice of the Canadian Minister of the day and that the Canadian forces are under Canadian control. They have indeed expressed agreement to that effect. The conditions such as appeared in the draft of the Treaty upon defence have no application to the Dominions at all. But the Crown functions in Canada with strong sentimental force—that is of great importance when you are considering the corresponding position of Ireland—and that the British government representing the Crown also possesses a strong sentimental force but that, in their positions as Dominions, Canada and the rest have achieved a virtual independence. The question is, can that position under this Treaty be given to Ireland, and I ask the consideration of this Assembly very seriously to this matter. Everybody knows how the Dominions of the British Crown have obtained their modern position. They have attained it for two reasons, the first of which is the greatest and most important—their vast distance from Great Britain, a distance which has made it physically impossible to exercise coercion over them, or to carry out the letter of the law which always exists and still exists over them. No such consideration applies to the position of Ireland. The second reason is that they are united by a blood tie with Great Britain. For the most part their inhabitants are connected by blood affinities with Great Britain. That strong sentimental association with the people of Great Britain, that, added to their vast distance, has made it natural and almost inevitable that they should acquire the independence they have acquired. No such consideration exists in the case of Ireland. An ancient and separate racial entity at perpetual war with Great Britain—war, trouble and dissension of some kind for 750 years—and at war for the precise reason that there was no racial affinity and no common national tradition with Great Britain and Great Britain sought throughout the whole of that period to impose her racial characteristics and racial authority over Ireland. Now are you going to stake the destinies of Ireland in the two words in that Treaty, “constitutional usage”? Who is going to interpret those words, what court or by what method, or who is to say what is “constitutional usage”? I know of no court or any method or any tribunal by which this vital question could be answered in a manner that would guarantee the independence of Ireland. What I do know is that the King of England will still be King of Ireland through his representative in Ireland with the functions he exercises being exercised in Ireland from day to day in every particular of the national life in legislative and executive matters. That is what I know. I know too that there has been an internal conflict in Ireland in respect of the exercise of that legal authority between the Irish people and the British people and that Ireland lies within a few short miles of England. So that the Governor General, representing the British King, can communicate by telephone with Downing Street and that the performance of all his functions are legislative and executive. And that the Governor General, do what you will, will not be sitting as he sits in the Dominions 3,589 miles away from the centre. But here in Ireland, close to England in direct contact with all British influences, British statesmen—and unfortunately what will still remain—pro-British influences gathering around that Governor General, as will surely happen, when he forms his court in Ireland and [169] [gap in original] the centre and focus for the British influences in virtue of the British authority which he will carry from the exercise of his functions under the British Crown. You will not persuade me that Ireland under these two words “constitutional usage” is going to have the freedom of the Dominion of Canada or anything approaching it. As to the Oath I have to say very little. A great deal of importance is attached to it very naturally because so to speak it crystallises and symbolises a certain physical state of things—but only a very few people take the Oath, a hundred or two going to the legislative assembly. They are not more bound by the taking of that Oath than any of those sent into Parliament or any citizen of the Irish State or rather, I should say, a subject of King George's because under that Treaty every Irishman and every Irishwoman will be, don't mistake it, a subject of King George. But the Oath as I say sums up the position in a few words for those who are to go to the legislate [sic]. Every citizen of Ireland will be in this situation. He will be a subject of King George and he must be loyal and faithful to that authority which carries with it British authority or he must be a rebel to that authority. There is no choice between those two positions. Now I have dealt with the implications and the direct meaning of clause I of the President's draft. I ask your attention now to clauses 2, 3, 4 and 5 which deal with a parallel subject of great importance also—the association of Ireland in the British Commonwealth—an association to which the Irish people, at any rate Dáil Éireann, is committed to the possibility of making, and if anyone felt himself not committed to it he should have spoken upon September 13th. But no such word was spoken. These clauses provide for that association and it is clearly necessary—it must be necessary to all who understand the subject—to lay down some rules and conditions governing the terms on which Ireland enters the association because the entry to that association might mean more than one thing. It might mean that Ireland would be bound by the majority vote of the members of this body to which she associated herself. Under this draft Ireland is associated with the British Commonwealth. She might be bound by the majority of the votes of the states composing that Commonwealth or by some central autocratic authority like England which is itself the strongest and most important state in the Commonwealth. Therefore it is necessary to define Ireland's status in the association and the terms on which she would enter that association. Those objects are carried on the clauses 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of that document. I would draw your attention to the second clause. It reads, “That, for purposes of common concern, Ireland shall be associated with the States of the British Commonwealth, viz. the Kingdom of Great Britain, the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa.”

MR. COLLINS: Why didn't you put in the Dominion of Ireland?

MR. CHILDERS: That clause that I have just laid stress on indicated in more confirmatory manner the quality of the status with Great Britain and if she has equality of status at least in rights no less than those enjoyed by any of the other states. This clause defines the position of Ireland when acting in co-operation with these states as follows, “That the matters of ‘common concern’ shall include Defence. Peace and War, Political Treaties, and all matters now treated as of common concern amongst the States of the British Commonwealth, and that in these matters there shall be between Ireland and the States of the British Commonwealth ‘such concerted action founded on consultation as the several Governments may determine’.” I would draw your closes attention to those words, “such concerted action founded on consultation as the several Governments may determine.” You will see those words are in quotation marks indicating that they come from a certain document which was agreed to in 1917 by the states of the British Commonwealth, including Great Britain, at an Imperial Conference which considered the “Constitutional position of the Dominions”. The Dominions at that time had just been committed to the war without their consent. They joined in it although they had been committed to it without their consent, but afterwards a strong complaint was made that they should never be committed without their own consent. That was felt so strongly that the matter was brought up in explicit form before the Imperial Conference and they stated their [170] position not alone in that matter but in all matters by [gap in original] which appears at the end of that clause, “Such concerted action founded on consultation as the several Governments may determine”. In other words they enter in future such a conference with their hands free and they are not to be bound by a vote of the majority, least of all by the direction of Great Britain. They are to consult with each other and each of them take such action as their own government might determine. When I spoke of the virtual independence of the Dominions I had in my mind that particular clause. That sums up the modern constitutional evolution of these countries. It sums it up in a better and more authoritative manner than anything that can be expressed. There is no legal authority behind that resolution. It did not alter the law governing the relations with Great Britain; nevertheless it would have a binding effect on their future relations. Under this proposed Treaty by which you enter into an association with that Commonwealth it was necessary to define these relations. It commits Ireland to nothing more than that consultation with the other states of the Commonwealth including Great Britain with the right to take any action determined by her own Irish Government. I want you to compare that clause with clause 1 in the draft of the Treaty. It is the corresponding clause in the Treaty which defines the position of Ireland in relation to the Commonwealth and Great Britain. You will observe there is nothing stated there as stated in the President's draft. The only nations named are the Dominions; the Dominion of Canada, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa. The Commonwealth is not defined as comprising Great Britain and the Dominions and nothing is added further than that constitutional form defining the relation of Ireland to these other states. I think it was not inserted for a very good reason. Words like these might be inserted. Those were actually proposed to the British government on more than one occasion as you will know when you read the document which the publication committee has selected and will lay before you [and] was refused in conjunction with other proposals. It is useless to say that Ireland would have the same position as the other states in vital matters of common concern or that her Government will be able to determine her own action in these vital matters after consultation. I will tell you one very good reason why that would be impossible, if for no other reason that would arise from the proximity of Ireland to Great Britain which in itself would tend to limit and abolish these constitutional safeguards and privileges without any consultation whatsoever. Apart altogether from that no such equality of position could exist with the defence clauses which exist in the signed Treaty. You will now probably recognise their significance in the subject I am discussing. The matters of common concern in the President's draft are defence, peace and war, political treaties. They are mentioned there, some of them, because they are important. After 5 years, under the provisions in the President's draft—and I have explained to you why this interval of 5 years was necessary—Ireland will have a completely free hand to act in accordance with the terms set out in clause 4, that is to take “such concerted action founded on consultation as the several Governments may determine”. Under the defence clauses of the President's draft Ireland would have a free hand at the end of 5 years in these matters but under the clauses of the Treaty signed in London never, never. If Ireland is to be permanently occupied by British troops with permanent positions which can only be altered by the will of Great Britain, it is obvious that matters of defence, peace and war, and political treaties which may involve this country in war cannot be matters of common concern in which Ireland will have freedom of action. That should be obvious. It is useless to suppose that Ireland will have the same constitutional status as the Dominion of Canada much less the same status as Great Britain which is said to be their equal under the terms of the Treaty. Everyone here should realise the step they are taking. You should cherish no illusions. Face the matter and ratify if you will but you should not be under any silly illusions. Ratify if you will but do so with the full knowledge of what it means. I have laid my principal stress on those vital preliminary clauses of the President's draft and the Treaty signed in London because they are matters which must determine the decision of this House. There are other matters but they are of less importance than those referred to. They can be dealt with rapidly. In 11 and 12 of the President's draft which I am taking as a text(?). [171] For this statement in accordance with the system of debate pursued—it arranged for civil communication by air and for the free entry of ships to and between the ports of Ireland and Great Britain [sic]. Clause 13 hardly needs much reference. As the President points out very fairly, under this clause he is agreeable to the setting up of an arbitration tribunal to determine Ireland's liability for the present public debt of Great Britain and Ireland as might be fair and equitable, leaving it open to Ireland, if possible, to take over her obligations as a lump sum and free of further financial obligations to Great Britain. Clause 14 is substantially the same as that in the Treaty signed in London. Clause 15 is also contained in the Treaty, though in a different place, and certainly guarantees against any kind of religious tyranny; a kind of clause which appears in many nations. Clause 16 I shall say little about because the President has dealt with it. He pointed out the changes it contains as compared with the Treaty in London. They are vitally important for the constitution of Ireland as it exists at present. The remaining clauses refer to Ulster and are without any substantial alteration for those contained in the London Treaty with the exception that the important declaratory clause, No. 17, declaring the essential unity of Ireland as a principle is not continued in the London Treaty.

MR. COLLINS: Pure Partition.

MR. CHILDERS: Then there is the last clause of the President's draft, No. 23, which reads: “That this instrument shall be submitted forthwith by His Britannic Majesty's Government for the approval of the Parliament at Westminster and by the Cabinet of Dáil Éireann to a meeting of the members elected for the constituencies in Ireland set forth in the British Government of Ireland Act 1920, and if approved shall be ratified by the necessary legislation.” That brings me to the end of the President's draft. I would only ask you to compare it as a whole with the Treaty signed in London and form your decision between the two. In my opinion the decision should be the President's draft truly carries out an honourable arrangement that can be made with England, reconciles Irish national aspirations with the association of nations comprising the British Commonwealth. The Treaty signed in London does not carry that out. It will create a position that is not true—a false position in which Irishmen the moment it is signed and for generations to come will be forced to act a lie, giving allegiance and obedience to an authority which they by their own act have repudiated and which it was the object of the creation of this assembly to repudiate. They cannot truthfully abide by the terms of the Treaty. On the other hand they could truthfully abide by the terms of the President's draft. It is of the most enormous importance that this fact should be realised here and realised also by England because it is to the interests of England to make an arrangement with Ireland not based on any falsification of fact or ambiguity or misunderstanding but on the truth on which both sides have long quarrelled. When Ireland comes to an honourable agreement with England then can the two countries go forward in peace and amity.

MR. GRIFFITH: I am not the next speaker but I want to say two words here with reference to the last speaker. I was chairman of the delegation of which Mr. Erskine Childers, not with my approval, was appointed secretary. Mr. Childers said there should be no illusions and there shall be none amongst the members. Mr. Childers made a long and laboured argument to point out that the Treaty signed in London in referring to Canada does not mean that Ireland in law as well as in fact will have the same powers as Canada as implied by the words “constitutional usage”. That phrase was made by Mr. Chartres and Mr. Childers to secure that every power enjoyed by Canada should also be given to Ireland and now he makes an argument against it. I say that is a dishonest argument (cries of, Order, order). Mr. Chartres and Mr. Childers were the two men who made that phrase “constitutional usage” saying it would cover every possible power Canada had. We went to the conference, we fought upon it and we got it put in. Now Mr. Childers comes along and tells you it means nothing. He knows the authority we have to appeal to is the League of Nations of which are a member [sic]. I say that argument from beginning to end is utterly dishonest.

MR. CHILDERS: Am I to be allowed to answer?

SPEAKER: You will be allowed to reply especially when the word dishonest was used. Terms of that kind must not be used by the members of this House.

MR. CHILDERS: I find myself in a great difficulty. Mr. Griffith, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, has alluded to matters that went on inside the delegation. I have not. Of course I was secretary of that delegation and I was cognisant of the opinions expressed by the delegates. I was permitted—I had the honour—to attend all their meetings though I was not present at the negotiations except at the first few of the preliminary conferences at which hardly any progress was made. Mr. Griffith made allusion to my action at a certain stage in these proceedings. I want to know what is to be deduced from that. Am I to be allowed to explain fully what took place at those meetings which led up to the point he was making against me on which he founded the accusation that I was making a dishonest speech? I don't know what to do, I honestly tell you. I think it is monstrous.

GRIFFITH MR. GRIFFITH

MR. GRIFFITH: I made a straight statement. I said the phrase “constitutional usage” was coined by Mr. Childers and now he gets up and denounces his own phrase.

MR. CHILDERS: I do not know how far I can go in this explanation. I may say this; I am entitled to say it in view of what the Minister of Foreign Affairs said. I, as he knows perfectly well, took strong line on the whole matter from first to last. I was permitted to share in debates—

MR. COLLINS: Mr. Speaker, on a point of order—

MR. GRIFFITH: I have made a certain statement about Mr. Childers, he is the author of that phrase.

MR. COLLINS: I of course will have to explain also but my explanation will be at the public session of the Dáil. I said on all occasions that I was befogged by constitutional and legal arguments. I did not understand them then. I don't now. I didn't care for them then. I don't now.

MR. CHILDERS: I was fundamentally opposed to the document presented to us by the British Government?

MR. GRIFFITH: Does Mr. Childers deny the phrase?

COUNTESS MARKIEVICZ: Surely if Mr. Childers helped Mr. Griffith to find a phrase, surely that does not preclude him from denouncing the whole document.

SPEAKER: A statement has been made in grave language against a member and he must be allowed to make an explanation.

MR. CHILDERS: It was my duty as secretary, and I considered that the worst possible document, to help so far as I could in improving it. The words “constitutional usage” did not appear in point of fact in the first draft. In an attempt to get some kind of result from the document submitted to us by Mr. Griffith we put in those words. To brand me as a dishonest man because I endeavoured to improve a rotten draft by some word that may be a little better is a monstrous thing.

MR. GRIFFITH: That does not answer my question.

MR. COLLINS MR. COLLINS

MR. COLLINS: If there is anything about the position or any points to be spoken of here about the delegation I am willing and anxious that all documents and all letters should be put before the members of this Assembly. I did take a strong line on some things because I was sick and tired of legal arguments.

MR. Ó MÁILLE: I would suggest to you, Mr. Speaker, that a rule should be made upon the time allowed to each speaker. A number of us here from the country, only plain ordinary men, are entitled to a voice in the proceedings as well as anyone else.

MR. KEVIN O'HIGGINS: I have listened with considerable attention to Mr. Childers' erudite eulogy of the President's draft and I am sorry it has fallen to my lot to bring this Assembly back to earth from the rarified atmosphere of the top storey of Mr. Childers' castle in the air. I have to remind you that this draft of the President, if you swallow it, involves the rejection of the Treaty. I have to remind you if you swallow this draft of the President that it is very doubtful if the country will, more particularly if the swallowing of the draft involves the resumption of war against [173] fearful odds. Mr. Childers made a certain case for the draft which differs somewhat from the case made by the President. Mr. Childers' case was that it is a very considerable improvement upon the Treaty. The President's case was that it differed so little from the Treaty that rather than make war the English Government would give way. He (the President) spoke of the difference as one merely of shadows and said we were entitled to shadows. Mr. Childers—at some considerable length— went about showing that there were very real and very grave and very fundamental differences. Between two such eminent authorities on constitutional matters as the President and Mr. Childers it is hard to choose, where the main thing to bear in mind is that the adoption or approval of that draft for the President involves rejection of the Treaty. I wonder does the President mean to say he is gambling? Well, gambling is a legitimate thing up to a point but we selected 5 men of judgment, 5 men of outstanding worth, and we sent them to London and those men signed a Treaty believing they were getting the last ounce that could be got from the British Government and believing that the alternative would be terrible and immediate war for the country. Now we are asked to say that it is not the last word in war and that if we stand on the draft of President de Valera the British Government will give way. I say it will be an insult to the men you sent to London, an insult to the intelligence of the Dáil and an insult to the country if you ask them to back you on such a proposal. The scene preceding that Monday or Tuesday morning was this; a deadlock was reached on Sunday night, what was practically a break was reached on Monday, in a last desperate effort to reach an agreement the pleni-potentiaries—or some of them—again met the British representatives, it is true, at the request altogether of the British representatives. They had the treaty of Saturday before them. That treaty contained very grave defects. There was an objectionable trade clause and a defence clause and an objectionable clause relating to Ulster all of which were amended. And then we have all this about why didn't the President see the final draft? Why didn't the captain of the ship see it? That is hollow and foolish. He could never have seen it. Lloyd George said, “If I am going to fight again I am going to keep my friends both in Ireland and England and I will not give these things unless you sign.” The train was waiting and the gunboat ready to bring a letter to Craig either sending the new proposals or telling him the negotiations had broken down. They were faced with a choice and if they had shirked their responsibility they would have been false in their duty to the Dáil and the people of Ireland. And because they did not do it they are placed here like men in the dock—this because they fulfilled the trust placed in them through you by the people of Ireland. Great latitude has been allowed in the discussion on the President's draft. In it the President has been trying to find a way out of the welter he has created. So hasty, so precipitate, so eager was he to take action in this matter that the Minister of Local Government and myself had the very greatest difficulty in persuading on him to wait till the delegates arrived before he hurled a bombshell that split the greatest political movement, the solidest the world has ever seen. He waited for 24 hours and the next day the fateful Cabinet meeting was held. Even some people who were not entitled to speak at that meeting spoke to the President and implored him to consider what he was doing and to consider the consequences of his act but we might as well have tried to hold the west wind. Now the time of the session of An Dáil called to consider the document brought home by their representatives was taken up with reading of a document which represents the President's way out. Last October the Minister of Local Government and myself came deliberately to the decision that we would not recommend any settlement involving allegiance to the King of England. That is true, but I am not ashamed to plead guilty to the fact that I consider political realities and the consequence of my vote. It would be well for Ireland if the President considered most carefully the consequences of his action and if he faced political realities. I would have gone back to war rather than recommend a settlement involving allegiance if the Treaty had not been signed. But I face the political situation and realise that some of the biggest personalities in our movement—men who did more for the country than any other men—that they have considered this is the last ounce could be got from England, and who, knowing the situation better than I do, attached their [174] names to that document. In the face of that we could not ask the country to go back to war and if you do what will you have, a demoralised, dispirited, disunited country and, with due deference to those in authority, a demoralised, dispirited army, an army many of whose members would say, “What was good enough for Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins is good enough for us. Why should we be hurled back to war again on a whim?” Now, Mr. Childers on speaking of this draft of the President's and comparing it with the other Treaty signed in London spoke of it rather in the tone of a man who was saying, “You could have either if you reject this Treaty”. I do not know what reason he has to suppose that the English Parliament and the English Government are going to swallow the difference between the Treaty and Document No. 2. My own view is that Ireland would have to go down on its knees to see what the difference Mr. Childers says does he think England— because the Dáil says we won't have this— that England is going to give. Does he not think that England knows if she resumes war that Ireland will be at her mercy with her people disunited and broken up into fractions? Mr. Childers made another statement that Ireland will be the bond-slave of England and the English King under the Treaty. I will appeal against that to an authority and that is the authority of Mr. Childers himself for which I am sure he has the greatest respect. I want to refer to a document he put in himself, “Law and Fact in Canada.”

MR. CHILDERS: May I ask that the whole of the document if part of it is read.

MR. O'HIGGINS: It is in 2 parts. If Mr. Childers insists I will go through the lot of

MR. CHILDERS: It is a question of giving fairly and fully what is in that document.

MR. O'HIGGINS: In the Treaty we come here to the end of Clause 2 governing relations of the Crown and the Irish Free State. I do submit the words “constitutional usage” are there for one purpose and one purpose only and that is to neutralise and nullify the word “law”. They are put into that clause with that purpose and they are the safeguards our constitutional experts advised. The British representatives spoke of the Crown merely as a shadow but it was such an important sentiment to the English people that they would never, and no government could ever, carry those proposals if it were not put in, but they agreed to put in any safeguard and [recte that] the Crown would have no greater authority in Ireland than in Canada. The insertion in the Treaty of the words “constitutional usage” were then put in on the advice of our experts, whether Mr. Childers or Mr. Chartres, or Chartres-cum-Childers, I don't know which but at any rate these words, following the word law, “practice and constitutional usage”, was what they decided to put in to ensure that the Crown would have no greater powers than in Canada.

MR. CHILDERS: Not to ensure.

MR. O'HIGGINS: Mr. Childers asked who was to be the judge. My answer is, not the League of Nations. We are to be the judge and we to be the court. I say and [recte that] the fidelity in the Oath which we say will give to the King of England is contingent on England respecting to the full the terms of this Treaty. If she tries to infringe on those terms then, in so far as that Oath was taken at the cannon's mouth, its binding force disappears. We are the judges how far the words “practice and constitutional usage” are binding. Then we would have an army.

DR. FERRAN: Would you go to war in defence of your opinions?

MR. O'HIGGINS: We would have no enemy in occupation then. These safeguards were put in to ensure that the power of the Crown would be no greater in Ireland than in Canada. Members talk of a way out. I do not see any way out. I do not see any way out now. There was a way out last Thursday and, if the President gave as much time and thought to the matter then as no doubt he has given to it since, a way out no doubt could have been found. The President as representative of a weaker nation up against the alternative of war could have issued such a document which, while it prepared the nation for acceptance, would still remind them that it was not recognition of their independence. He could still with grave dignity have accepted but he could have said, “The [175] alternative for my country is war”. He could have said our representatives in London were threatened with terrible and immediate war if this document were not accepted and signed. In that spirit and in that spirit only Dáil Éireann will accept. It could have taken this Free State in such a way that this Treaty would have no binding force in Ireland. But instead he split the finest, the solidest political movement the world has ever seen from top to bottom.

PRESIDENT DE VALERA: I must protest.

COUNTESS MARKIEVICZ: It is most undignified that any member should get up and abuse the President without any protest from this House. The President's action is not under discussion.

MR. O'HIGGINS: This Document No. 2 is being commented upon.

MR. P. BRENNAN: It is just as well face it now before we go into public.

O'HIGGINS MR. O'HIGGINS

MR. O'HIGGINS: The President's way out is no way out. It involves rejection of the Treaty and brings a demoralised country back into war unless England is so foolish to give the difference between this document and the Treaty. I submit that, knowing well the conditions existing in the country, they will not give the difference.

A MEMBER: Some men could not see principle if they had a microscope.

MR. O'HIGGINS: It has been said that to ratify this Treaty involves an abandonment of principle, that it is a betrayal of the principles of the men who died for independence in the past. When a country went to war in a just cause, or when an unjust war was forced upon it, must it continue that war? Has it no right to make terms? I submit that the men who went out in 1916 went out in the spirit that a military victory was out of the question and that they had to take terms in the interests of the nation that fell short of independence. Does anyone submit they would have fought on for a recognition of Irish independence? Are we to be denied that right to make terms in their name today? If the principle of Irish nationality is not immortal then it has died many deaths because the chiefs of the Irish clans swore allegiance to Henry VIII, the members of Grattan's Parliament sat in allegiance to the King of England and from 1800 we have been sending members to sit in the English Parliament at Westminster; and yet when Pearse went out in 1916 and proclaimed a Republic would anyone say he was acting dishonourably because the Irish chiefs gave allegiance to Henry VIII, because Grattan's Parliament sat in allegiance to the King at the time, or because John Redmond and his Party took an oath to the King of England? Parnell in his fight for freedom took an oath to the King of England. The struggle was a constitutional one and Parnell said no man had a right to set bounds to the march of a nation or to say thus far shalt thou go and no further. We who stand for this Treaty stand for it in the full truth of Parnell's dictum (applause).

MR. GRIFFITH: I would like to say that in my reference to Mr. Childers I did not wish to imply that he himself is dishonest. I did not mean the man himself, I referred to his argument.

On resuming at 7.20 p.m. on Thursday 15th December THE SPEAKER said: I understand there is a motion to come before us for adjournment. Several members have sent me questions and I have them in hands for some time and perhaps it would be well before we take this adjournment that the questions should be asked. I take these questions now. The first is from Seán O'Dea¹. It is:

1. This is an error. There was no Deputy of this name.

“I desire to ask the chairman of the delegation of plenipotentiaries whether there is any written undertaking as to the length of time the process of evacuation of the British forces is considered or expected to take?”

SEÁN O'DWYER MR. SEÁN O'DWYER

MR. SEÁN O'DWYER (?)²: Before you ask that, I would like to say this that before we begin for every reason I hope you will make an appeal to all of the members to conduct this discussion with decorum and good feeling and with respect for one another.

2. Question mark is in original. There was no member of this name.

THE SPEAKER: I am sure it should not be necessary for me to make any such appeal. But I put it on this ground that any divisions that exist here and might take an unpleasant form are certain to be reflected in an aggravated form in the public outside, and that I am sure is what every single member here desires—namely to avoid the division of our country in the face of the enemy of our country into two hostile camps. I hope that the circumstances will not be denied that we are still in the face of the enemy and that our division into two hostile camps is the most fatal thing that could happen to us, because it would not be only disastrous to us but would dishonour us before the entire world. Now the best means that all of you can take to avoid that is to avoid it between yourselves, for any overstrain of feeling that is exhibited here is reflected outside. You are the pick of the nation sent here as representing the nation. Any overstrain that is shown here—I know people can't help feeling the strain but it is their business to restrain themselves outwardly—any strain here will be aggravated in its reflections on the nation; and therefore I would ask every single member when speaking to bear that in mind—that a degree of difference here between you is certain to be reflected in an aggravated degree in the country; and the result of that will be more and more to divide us into two camps in the face of the enemy. Now it is not necessary for me to enlarge on that. I hope it is not. I myself, I suppose, feel the strain as strongly as any one does. I feel the crisis that we are in perhaps as strongly as anyone does here and I do my best not to allow myself to exhibit that in my personal feeling towards anyone; and every single one of you can do the same and not only can you do it but you must do it. You are bound in duty to the country to do it and every person who transgresses that duty at this time commits a very serious offence against the good of the country and against the interests of the country. It is not consistent with fidelity to our national ideals to forget ourselves, to indulge in any fierce recrimination amongst ourselves.

MR. A. GRIFFITH: On the evacuation question Mr. Lloyd George said to us, and in his letter he repeated it, that immediately on ratification of the Treaty he would start the withdrawal of the Crown forces from Ireland. He said it would take about a month. In about a month they would be all out. Are these other questions to me?

THE SPEAKER: Yes.

MR. A. GRIFFITH: Would it not be well I saw them?

THE SPEAKER: Yes, I think you are right. I should pass these questions to the Ministers. Here is a question addressed to the President, “Has the President received any report from the Chief of Police as to the burglary from the office of the the Minister of Finance?”

THE PRESIDENT: I have been told by the Minister of Home Affairs that the police are investigating the matter and I also spoke to the Minister of Finance and he said I need not bother about it. Is not that so?

MR. M. COLLINS: Arrangements are being made for men to be put in there to-night.

PRESIDENT DE VALERA: A word or two with reference to the remarks made by the speaker who spoke just before the adjournment, with reference to the saying there is an inconsistency between Deputy Childers' statement and mine. It is only an apparent inconsistency. If constitutional usage were to cover everything—we have no guarantee of that—there would be very little difference. There would be of course vital difference on the allegiance or the acceptance of the King as the King of Ireland. There is one further vital difference, that is the difference between the permanent occupation of Ireland, of Irish ports, and so on which is possible in one case and is not possible in the other. Now I must protest against accusation of causing a split. I had either to do my duty or not. Once before, when another political movement asked me for unity when conscription was on, I agreed to it. If people are going to hell I never think it useful to be with them going there. I felt it was my duty not to do that as regards the division in the Cabinet which originated not with me. The Minister for Defence here put it up to Mr. Griffith when he was going back, when he thought there was a possibility of accepting the Crown, that it would mean a split. Mr. Griffith said he [177] could not break on that; he thought there would be a split. Mr. Griffith said he could not break on that; he thought that there would be a split anyway. Then he undertook to bring it back to the Dáil. I was not responsible for the split so I did let it appear that the document for which I was in agreement I did say that that was Government policy and they have to pass it afterwards and I would be told why didn't you say so at first.

MR. GRIFFITH: I say nothing against what the President said: “If we break on the Crown we would also have a split in the country”. But the President got the option of coming to London.

PRESIDENT DE VALERA: There was a principle to gain so I was making up my mind whether I would go or not. I explained it when Mr. Griffith gave the undertaking that he would not sign it, that he would put it before the Dáil. I felt it was not necessary; I probably would have gone.

MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: As a result of some of the remarks I made the Minister for Finance offered after the five of you came back five others would go. I would have accepted that only for the undertaking given by the chairman of the delegation that he would sign nothing, that he would tell Mr. Lloyd George that he would come back here and leave it to the Dáil.

MR. M. COLLINS: I think it only right to say there was a document there and Mr. Griffith said he would not sign that document and a different document was signed. Whatever we may say to the fundamentals we can get right on this. If it is to be suggested that I for one would be responsible for any split that is not the position. I have suggested to the Dáil to ask for my resignation. If the Treaty is rejected I am not going to make a split. I will follow in the position that I should be in and you can get over it by being men, by accepting or rejecting and finishing it.

COUNTESS MARKIEVICZ: I only want to say this. As far as the split is concerned I say the preliminary to a split first occurred when the Treaty was published. I myself would not have ratified that Treaty when I read it first and not only I but other people that I have spoken to. Therefore I maintain that any difference of opinion that could possibly lead to a split occurred when the Treaty was first published, not after our President's answer appeared in the paper.

MR. LIAM DE RÓISTE: Is there any use at all in this talk on the resolution that we go into private session to-morrow at 11 o'clock? We will hear all these arguments again.

THE SPEAKER: I hope not. There are two questions before us that have been raised—that is to say the question of personal responsibility as to what has happened and the future question as to what the Dáil itself is going to do. These are totally different questions. I don't want to sidetrack either of them. But I want to know would it be possible to deal with this as a matter of personal responsibility because they are not the same thing. The merits of the decision you have to come to are absolutely independent of the merits of the action taken by people in coming to that decision. There is no connection between the two at all. You will do wrong, if the Treaty is wrong, by adopting it. You will do right, if the Treaty is right, by accepting it and it will make no difference to you if other people have done right or wrong before you. I appeal to the people on both sides to weigh this. The question of responsibility could be dealt with in some other way because it is a challenge to us. We have been holding a kind of trial or impeachment in this matter. That is not what the public is interested in and it is not the crucial point. It's the Treaty or no Treaty. I am throwing that out for you. Reflect on, between this and our next meeting, that there is any other way of dealing with these charges and counter charges besides talking at this meeting.

LIAM DE RÓISTE: I propose that we now adjourn.

THE PRESIDENT: I second that.

MR. DOLAN: I oppose it. We have a lot of preliminary work to do before we come to the real work we have to do. And I think there is good time being lost tonight if this House adjourns without having done something. And I think it would be a great mistake to adjourn. I say we can sit on here till 10 o'clock tonight and do good and useful work for the nation.

MR. MILROY: Before you put that motion I would like to ask you what is the business for tomorrow's private session?

PRESIDENT: In my position as President and Leader of the House I speak. When the motion was moved my object in seconding it was that we would not be able here tonight to come to any decision as regards the private session—we would want to discuss this matter further and that would mean that we could not begin a public session tomorrow. If you have a half a day off it will do you a lot of good to be able to approach the public session then.

MR. M. COLLINS: I would like to know what's the necessity for any further private session unless to arrange for a public session. We have talked and talked. Might we not as well have dealt with the matter at a public session and gone straight for a straight issue acceptance or rejection and let us have that finished with. The issue of course has been cleared considerably by the document that the President has put in. But otherwise I don't think we have advanced one bit from where we adjourned the public session.

MR. GAVAN DUFFY: The private session was decided upon so that we might clear the air. The air is not cleared yet as the large body of the private members have not expressed their minds at all. The documents which the committee have decided to put before the House have not yet been put before the House. In the circumstances I do suggest that you should give ample time to this Assembly to discuss the matter and that you should do something tonight and give the whole of to-morrow to the private session

MR. M. COLLINS: The documents can't be ready tonight, and if we could start with them at 11 o'clock in the morning we might do some good.

MR. LIAM DE RÓISTE: First and foremost we are here all day listening to certain statements being made on one side or another—statements which I contend are not connected with the issue here and things that should be settled between the Cabinet and certain members of the delegation in London. It is my opinion and the opinion of others that heard for the first time some Cabinet secrets that we were never told before, and it would be to the advantage of the whole country if we had been told them in the past. We come up here and we are in no particular hurry about this Treaty at all. On its acceptance or rejection, it happens, rests interests of the country and nation and we are prepared to remain here for twelve months if necessary to prevent a split in the country. Now I propose adjourning into a private session tomorrow because I fear that if we go into a public session the things that we have been listening to—it is not a split in the Dáil but a split throughout the country, a split in the army and a split in the Sinn Féin organisation and the enemy taking advantage of it. And I think it is the interest of every one in this Dáil to prevent such a thing happening at this time. Why I propose we don't go on tonight is because we have had quite enough of the things that we have been listening to this day. And if there is anybody in authority in the Dáil I think it is their duty to put it before us in the Dáil if we are a Parliament—some Orders of the Day, some procedure to discuss and not a few cries across the floor of the House. If we are to regard ourselves as a Parliament I think that should be done tonight. So that when we go into private session tomorrow we know what we are discussing.

PROFESSOR HAYES: I am told by the secretary that the documents will be ready in the morning and they could not be given out to anyone but to the staff of Dáil Éireann. With these documents in your hands in the morning I speak in favour of adjourning now provided an agenda is produced for the private session. The agenda paper yesterday was not kept to. The first motion was a private session. We discussed at one and the same time yesterday the President's speech and the motion to go into private session and the amendment to the motion and a further amendment at one and the same time. If there is any government in this country and if there is anything to be done at a private session why not have an agenda? And I make this suggestion that the whole Cabinet comes together (nobody has resigned) comes together to draw up an agreed agenda for a private session and that we should keep rigorously and absolutely to that agenda. At the public session we have only one thing to discuss, that is the motion for the ratification of [179] the Treaty and the things arising out of that. I don't like to speak of the two sections of the Cabinet. If the Cabinet as a whole put before us an agenda it would be a help to everybody. If any question arising out of these documents have to be discussed surely the Cabinet is capable of drawing up an agenda for us and keeping to it. Here yesterday we had only one thing. We got a definite statement from the Minister for Defence that he would make a certain investigation into certain things. We had today the President's document. I challenge anybody in this House to know what we are doing with it. In point of fact the Speaker told us it would be out of order to adopt it. Can't the Cabinet as a whole get a decision and tell us and we will do it. But if we are going into a private session tomorrow at 11 o'clock with every member of this House supplied with documents which he can't read in two hours and they will adjourn again. The country wants to know. Therefore I suggest as a definite amendment to the motion that we adjourn into a private session and that the Cabinet provide an agenda for tomorrow.

DR. CUSACK: A matter to be discussed in private before this meeting is—what are we going to do if we reject the peace terms or what are we going to do as a body if the Treaty is accepted by a majority? That to my mind is most important. It is more important for us to know, say, if the necessary steps be taken. What this body wants is to safeguard all Ireland and I think some decision should be made by the Dáil and get some inkling of how we stand in the matter.

MR. DOLAN: I withdraw my motion in favour of the one proposed, adjourn until 11 a.m. and in the meantime a proper agenda should be prepared and put before us tomorrow. And the thing being so I would like to take a direct negative to the attitude taken up by the member for Cork when he states that it would be well for us to continue here in a lengthy session and I maintain, if we do, the country will split no matter what we will do. And I maintain that we would be making a very serious mistake if we had a protracted private session when the country wants to know what we are talking about. We came here definitely to decide for or against the Treaty. I am for tackling the Treaty at once and each man give his reason publicly for and against.

PROFESSOR STOCKLEY: I would like to say something between the twelve months session and the feeling of the Minister of Finance for instant decision. It seems to me people do want to have time to express their opinions. It seems to me that if we adjourn tonight there would be a good deal of talk. It might do quite as much good.

A DEPUTY: Or harm (laughter).

PROFESSOR STOCKLEY: Yes, or harm. Therefore I should like to second the proposal of Professor Hayes. I do not think it would be wise though I can sympathise with the irritation felt about the prolonging of the private session. Still I think it is not wise to prevent as many things being said as reasonably possible. It is for everybody to make up his mind on this; on the question of instant decision—

MR. M. COLLINS: I did not say instant decision. I said instant tackling.

MR. A. GRIFFITH: I am opposed to this motion. I agree with Mr. Dolan. I know the country too. If we defer our decision beyond Saturday at the latest you will have trouble in the country. I think we will have to hold a public session on Saturday. If we go over the week-end people will get impatient and they will cry out why has not the Dáil been able to make up its mind. I think it would be better to adjourn. We would be fresher in the morning. I think the best thing to-morrow would be if we as Cabinet Ministers hold our tongues and the other members can thresh it out.

MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: I withdraw my objection to the adjournment.

PROFESSOR HAYES: Is my motion being put to the House?

THE SPEAKER: Yes.

Motion put and agreed to.

House adjourned until 11 o'clock to-morrow morning, Friday, 16th December.

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