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The Treaty Debate:
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~ The Treaty ~ The Treaty Debate 16th December 1921 On resuming THE DEPUTY SPEAKER, BRIAN O'HIGGINS, took the Chair at 7.30 p.m. and said: There are several names on the list of speakers, of people, of Deputies, who wish to speak this evening if we are not to continue in private session tomorrow. I would again ask those Deputies who are about to speak to be as brief as possible. I asked that before and it could be done by some of them with very great benefit. I hope what I am saying will have some good effect now. MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: I suggest that we should discuss now whether we could have a public session tomorrow or postpone it until Monday. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER: I now call on the Teachta for Luimneach—M. P. Collivet. MR. ROBINSON: I wish to make an explanation. This morning the Chairman spoke of a bill which was posted at the door. Nobody down here could tell exactly what he said. However to clear the matter I want to say that I put that bill there and if I put it at the wrong side of the door I am sorry. MR. E.J. DUGGAN: I think this is a matter that is urgent. Within the past three days there have been six members of the British Crown forces shot in different parts of the country. Two of these were [212] killed—a British officer was shot at Ballybunion; on the 14th an R.I.C. sergeant was shot dead and a constable wounded near Kilmallock. That thing is spreading and reprisals will ensue and if we adjourn over the weekend I think you will agree that some action should be taken on the matter by our Government. The Castle authorities have written: “Sir, The circumstances which in the opinion of His Majesty's Government made [the] issue by them of an official statement immediately after they learned of the bomb outrage at Thurles on the 9th instant apply with equal force to the two cases of deliberate murder which have occurred in the last three days at Ballybunion and Kilmallock. I have, therefore, to urge upon you the necessity for a widely published statement of repudiation by official Sinn Féin of these crimes, which are, you will agree, atrocious breaches of truce if the perpetrators are members of your forces. I must warn you that the frame of mind of police who see these men with whom they were ‘at war’ a few months ago walking openly, protected by the Truce, while they themselves feel that they are not immune from attack and assassination is a source of growing anxiety, and I have to press upon you consideration of the view that the statement for which I ask would be not only a clear warning to the men who are taking upon themselves the responsibility for such acts of violence, but would have to some extent a calming effect upon the police. I am, Sir Your obedient servant MARK STRUPIN [Recte STURGES]” Continuing Mr. Duggan said, I would be glad if that matter should be discussed. I certainly think some statement should be issued in the press which would steady the country during the few days we are discussing this matter here. MR. M.P. COLLIVET: I propose that tomorrow's session be private and that tonight the President and members of the Cabinet issue a statement to the press pointing out that as we waited for seven centuries that we can wait for a few days longer. That will enable the public to understand the situation and it will have a great calming effect on them. They will be prepared to wait over until Tuesday or Wednesday. MR. LIAM DE RÓISTE: That was just what I had in view when I spoke a while ago. MR. MILROY: You must have these things separate. The question of issuing a statement is a distinctly different thing as to whether you will adjourn the public session over tomorrow and continue on in private session. MR. COLLIVET: I am willing to omit from my motion reference to the private session. Let the manifesto stand. MR. DUGGAN: I would like to hear some persons' views on the matter and then perhaps one or two can be appointed to draw up a statement on the matter— say Mr. Stack, Minister for Home Affairs. MR. AUSTIN STACK: I would be willing. PRESIDENT DE VALERA: The proper thing is to issue a statement through the press that if any member of our forces is found guilty of any acts of violence they will have to be dealt with by the Republican Government—any members responsible for acts of violence will have to be dealt with. MR. SEÁN T. Ó CEALLAIGH: I think now that the Cabinet should be got together to deal with this matter. If in the opinion of the chief liaison officer any of our forces have been guilty of them, or even if they have not, there is a state of unrest that is perhaps likely to grow if there is no statement from the Cabinet. I think the Cabinet ought get together and draw up a statement which could be issued in the name of a united Cabinet. I don't know whether the motion for a private session tomorrow is before you— THE DEPUTY SPEAKER: Not yet. MR. SEÁN T. Ó CEALLAIGH: I would [213] urge upon the Cabinet to consider this. I think the suggestion should go from Dáil to the Cabinet. MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: I think the obvious thing is for the Cabinet to meet and deal with the question. That's the wish of the House. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER: This is the motion moved by Deputy Collivet: “That tomorrow's session beginning at 11 a.m. be private and that tonight the President and the chairman of the plenipotentiaries issue to the press a joint manifesto over their names calling for calmness and patience and pointing out that as we have waited for seven centuries we can wait a few days now.” MR. MILROY: I think it was agreed to that the matter of the breach of the Truce should not be put with that. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER: No, no. It's an appeal to the people and to the country for calmness and patience. MR. MILROY: I don't think we should suggest the precise phraseology of it. MR. BÉASLAÍ: It seems to me that the question of the breach of the Truce and the private session in the morning are two separate things which should be taken separately. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER: We take the first part of this motion that tomorrow's session beginning at 11 a.m. be private. MR. S.T. Ó CEALLAIGH: I would like to urge that the private session be continued for another day. There are a number of people who haven't spoken yet and who wish to speak. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER: We must wait until it is moved as a motion. MR. COLLIVET: I move the first motion separately that tomorrow's session begin at 11 a.m. and be private. MR. MILROY: I am not convinced of the wisdom of deferring the public session but I am not going to move an amendment. When do you propose to have the public session? Perhaps tomorrow we may have discussions that could be taken at the public session. There are other matters that we should discuss in private. But we may go on in this way indefinitely. A DEPUTY: There is no hurry. MR. MILROY: There is considerable hurry. What has occurred—what has been referred to by the Deputy for Meath— indicates that there is a grave urgency for a definite decision upon this very serious matter. And I think we should have, before that is passed, some indication of the time, some date mentioned, when the public session will begin and that there will be no further question of deferring to a later date the public session. If the public session is deferred after this week and no Deputy here, no member of the Dáil, will avail of any functions that may intervene between now and the public session to make any public pronouncement. MR. M. COLLINS: I suggest that we ought make tomorrow's private session the last private session because it is having a demoralising effect upon ourselves. It is bad for our proceedings to be closed to the press and public and I think the public deserves some consideration. I think we ought have a definite understanding that tomorrow's private session be the last or that at least Monday morning's be quite definitely the last private session. MR. S.T. Ó CEALLAIGH: One particular reason I would like it not to be public for tomorrow, Saturday, is from the point of view of the public and press not the best day to start a public session which will probably not finish in one day, and Saturday evening from the point of view of the public and press is the least convenient day for a public session. I would earnestly suggest that we adopt the suggestion of the Minister for Finance that it be definitely fixed now—that the public session be opened at 11 o'clock on Monday morning. MR. ETCHINGHAM: I want to say the English Parliament have adjourned until Monday and they don't say what they are going to do. I suppose they are waiting on us and we are rushing this. We are doing good work here I believe (laughter). Well [214] now, this is not a trifling matter. I have said here before this evening it is a momentous thing for our country and we should not rush it. We should not take it lightly. I think the vast majority of us, myself included, are not capable of taking up the Treaty and discussing it as was Mr. Childers and I have heard men who were in favour of it say they didn't understand the Treaty until they heard him. That's no reproach to them. We are elected here because we stood for an ideal. I don't believe that we should rush this thing. We should not bind ourselves to any particular time. At least if we adjourn until morning we should not fix any particular time. There is no reason why we should hurry. MR. M. COLLINS: There is. There are serious reasons. MR. ETCHINGHAM: If this thing is issued to the country tonight—I mean this statement to be issued in the name of a united Cabinet— MR. P. BRENNAN: The country knows there is no united Cabinet. MR. ETCHINGHAM: They will not think so when they see this manifesto issued under the names of President de Valera and Mr. Griffith. I say adjourn the public session. Don't rush it. MR. M. COLLINS: Again it was said to me yesterday that I wanted to rush it. Let us talk about this thing in public for the next ten years if we like, but let us talk in public. MR. P. O'KEEFFE: I suggest our plenipotentiaries should be taken out of the dock. They are there long enough now —four days. MR. GRIFFITH: I certainly would not be for postponing the public session beyond Monday. I know by the indications I get from the last telegrams from the country how uneasy the people are, and the English Parliament is meeting in public and we can't justify meeting in private. I am in favour of having it on Monday in public. I don't think we should go beyond that in private. MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: I agree entirely with that. The main thing is that everyone should understand everything that is worth understanding about this question before he or she makes up his or her mind. A committee was appointed to select vital documents. Those documents are now in your hands. I realise that you could not digest those documents and be certain of coming to a proper conclusion if we had a public session tomorrow because we would not have time to do it. During the last half hour I found people down at tea who didn't understand what this Treaty means. Nevertheless you will have plenty of time between now and Monday to make up your minds. MISS MACSWINEY: In view of the very strict orders that were given to us about these documents I would like to suggest to you and the Deputies that, as it is not very late, we might read those documents very carefully before we leave this hall tonight. Because it is a serious thing for over 100 people to take away private documents, personally I should suggest to read them for an hour and then give them up before we leave the hall tonight. MR. M. COLLINS: I propose that the session adjourns now. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER: The mover and seconder are willing to let the motion go in the form, “That tomorrow's session be private and that the public session start on Monday at 11 a.m.” MR. GAVAN DUFFY: Have an agenda drawn up tomorrow. PROFESSOR HAYES: The only speech that was made here this evening was not a speech for or against the Treaty. Is it possible to keep to our resolution without discussing the ratification of the Treaty? But practically all that was said here this evening could be said in public session for or against the Treaty. And therefore if we make the rule that speeches for or against cannot be made tomorrow we can get business done. I suggest one important thing that we can discuss—namely what is going to happen in this Assembly when you have taken the vote? Consider the two things and make up your minds. Many members of the Dáil have not come to any conclusion as to what they are to do in the event of a certain vote. Now, the Minister [215] for Finance has stated that if he is beaten he will loyally support the Government and he has said that if they will go to war he will fight. I presume— MR. M. COLLINS: That is not fair comment. PROFESSOR HAYES: What I want to point out is this—the Minister for Finance is definitely committed to certain action if he is beaten. If he wins a different situation will arise and it will be very important for members of the Dáil to know what action is to be taken. And I don't know whether it is possible for us to come to any conclusion. In my consideration of this whole question of the Treaty this is a matter of grave concern. In either case you have disorder—in the one case war, in the other chaos. If the Treaty is ratified what are the people who are against the Treaty going to do—what action do they intend to take? It would be a great calamity if the President, whom we all know and for whose ability we have such regard, took certain lines of action which are obvious— to retire altogether and leave the Government to do what they like themselves— and if everybody who thinks with him did the same thing we all agree that it would be a disaster, a very serious thing, and I don't suggest to any man what he might do. It would be better before we go into public session to have some idea as to what is going to happen rather than we should have a prolonged debate in public session before taking a decision on it. It might be necessary, for example, for some men in this House who hold high rank in the army to be at home the time the decision is taken —in the one instance to be home to prepare for war, and on the other hand to see that their men observe discipline. They are all much more important questions in private session than the debate on the Treaty and I suggest that we devote our time to these questions. It grieves me to see these differences. I know men on the two sides of this question a long time and I would consider it a grave disaster to lose any of them and therefore I would like to know whether it is possible for us to come to an agreement. THE PRESIDENT: If I might from our side state—I am against it definitely. I am absolutely against the ratification of the Treaty. It is necessary for me in order to defend the position I take up to say what I would suggest to do. If the whole fate of the nation was in my single will I would vote against the Treaty and reject it on the basis—I do this now to explain my further attitude. I would reject the Treaty, demonstrate to the world that this little nation was going to stand for liberty in this particular respect, that it had a right to live its own life, that we didn't go into negotiations without having a purpose and that we honestly intended to make peace with them. And I would put forward—mind you —that document. I would never sign that Treaty. I expect you would have to break. And I was prepared personally to run the risk of breaking in order to see when they publish their document we would publish this. A lot of delegates were saying here today there was no difference between the Treaty and this document. Now remember, this was what our delegates would have tried to have got and they couldn't. And they took their own document only because they didn't have material backing in the way of armies to back up their will. Therefore let nobody say that this document which I substitute here is a document which is inferior to the other document. And their only excuse for not bringing a document like that is that the others (English plenipotentiaries) would not accept it. The only difference between us —I would take the risk of war and break. And my countermove would be to publish the whole matter. It would not split the country and I would have an answer to offer—a document like this—and I would tell the world, “Here is a basis for a lasting treaty, here is association with the British Empire which is compatible with Irish aspirations.” 216 217 The delegates' judgment was that war would ensue. I hold my own judgment and believe that with such a countermove war would not ensue. If I had at this moment and if it depended on my will and mine only, I would say so and I would reject the Treaty and make a magnificent demonstration all over the world of a little nation with all the power against it being able to say, “We will not do this”. And I would say, “Here there is a thing which we can do”. If I could induce the Dáil to do a thing like that I would. There is no likelihood that I can. I would say, “Reject the Treaty”. For a flat rejection would be dangerous but here you could not go to London—there would be no further question [216] of plenipotentiaries or anything else. Here is a definite thing which the nation's representatives will stand over. It is not a politician's peace. No politician in England would stand by them. Because they would have the same difficulty in legally ratifying this proposed Treaty that I hold our delegates have in ratifying it here constitutionally. It would not be a politician's peace but a peoples' peace. Now the other alternatives. Suppose the Treaty is ratified we have the position in this House. As far as I have personally considered the first position—all who would wish to have this Government established—I would have no interest in continuing in public life. In fine I am willing to serve in any position in which I would be of any use (applause). I regard this House as the sovereign Government of this nation. I regard the majority of the House as determining the will of the House and I say that every true Irishman [is] in bounden duty bound to obey the majority of this House whatever way it goes as the Government of the nation until the Government is disestablished. The Republic will not be disestablished until it is disestablished by the will of the people and if this thing is ratified it would be an outrageous thing. I would not take that Oath if I could help it. We talk of all this in private session. It is obvious that that is not something to go outside. I at least—this is what my idea is—we have got to the bridge and I knew for long just that we had to pass that bridge before we got to the goal of an independent isolated Republic. I hold, as far as isolation and association is concerned, I suppose isolation is the ideal thing, but I don't see myself any tremendous objection to association. If you have a certain weakness you have a certain strength. They balance each other. I am not particularly keen whether it is isolation or association. Now before we cross the bridge, we could all come together to that bridge. The only use I consider myself is that I had helped to bring the two forces together up to that bridge. And now we are at the bridge and my determination is that, whatever way we go, England is not going to force us back. Therefore I will act all the time in accordance with that. There is only one thing and I hope you will not consider it a personal matter though it might seem so. I hold in myself two offices. In my own person I combine two offices—one is President of this Assembly. And I have been by courtesy anyhow and I don't know whether it is legal—I am also President of the Republic. Now it is obvious that if Mr. Griffith—if the Treaty is ratified—and, if Mr. Griffith is allowed to govern it is obvious that he could not very well be called President of the Republic. He could be Prime Minister here. My point is this that there are dangers. There may be tricks played by the other side. I want to say that we are here in reserve. I know that most of you will vote for the ratification of the Treaty. You are voting for it because you don't mean to obey it. I could not do that. I don't think that is the right thing to do, I am dead against it. My conscience is against it. I don't think these methods ever succeed in the end. On the other hand I am standing on the other principle on which I believe it will succeed. I am against it because I fear that it won't but I assume that most of you take that because it is a Treaty it will be forced upon you under duress. I have taken the oath. You don't intend or wish that the nation would abide by it. You believe that it is forced upon you by force and that it is not binding upon you. You have a bird in the hand for the first time and the difference between your Treaty and mine is a bird in the hand. I have even said before that birds that were in the hand were better than in the bush. And it is not quite in the hand yet, it is only in the shell. So will you please remember now that there are dangers in the way. You have only one ground to fight upon and that is a Republic. You will never get the nation to fight for anything else. Therefore I want, until the Republic is disestablished by the people of Ireland, I want to see that there shall be some real ground in which we can all unite again to fight for the Republic and win. In three or four or five years one acquires a reputation. It is often through mythical grounds a person gets a reputation. Sometimes they are acquired and they are as valuable to the people as if he deserved it. I believe I have got a certain reputation. I don't deserve it. I don't know that I do. But the reputation for honesty, I want to preserve that for the benefit of the nation until such time— and I hope that all of you who vote for the Treaty will be knocked out and beaten at the first election—and I want at least to preserve that reputation and the value I might be to the nation and [217] the Republic in the position I have, and I believe that I would be able to rally the men and say that we would not be driven back across the bridge. I have always felt, far from making a split, I have taken the only action that is consistent with the nation's safety. Even though my opinions were not what they are I consider that it would be a lasting disgrace for all time that the man who is put in the position as I was of the first Irish citizen would stoop for a moment to be anything less than what he is—anything less than President. It is the most glorious title that any man could have. I would not give it for all the world of honour. But suppose I was a pure opportunist—I mean an opportunist for the nation—I would take the stand I am taking, and very far from running the nation into danger I am doing the best thing to safeguard the nation. I am sure that everybody here is able to stand as I am standing and say that he will [sic] by the majority of this House—this is the Government of the nation. There is no other way. We will be simply a divided, helpless, useless people except we make up our mind that there is a sovereign authority—that is what I mean when I state there is a constitutional way of settling our political differences. It can be settled here and settled for the nation. And therefore, if it goes the other way to make those who think like me take that course I will—but further everyone in this House is entitled to their own line of action. I have also other things that can be done in that connection. These things have to be kept locked in my own mind. I have taken one alternative to united ratification of the Treaty—non-ratification of the Treaty— which is the ideal one to my mind. If you don't ratify we will make this proposal— it is this we will watch and try what will happen next. If they make war I know all that involves. I know our comparative weakness with respect to the enemy. We had that weakness before. If I was in prison and could go and have my freedom as a ticket-of-leave man I would rather sit inside and die in prison than give my parole which would bind me on my own word of honour to stay there. DR. MACCARTAN: I think we have advanced a great deal since we came from tea. I think we should continue that advance. There is a different spirit on both sides of the House and the President said that we should not be forced across the bridge. And I think we should use the private session tomorrow and see how we could get across the bridge unitedly. Personally I am not inclined to vote for it but if this House asked me to vote publicly for the Treaty I would swallow my opinions in the interests of the nation. The suggestion is that we take up President de Valera's proposal tomorrow. I think it would be a great advantage if it were unanimously accepted. But if not I have no faith in it at all. On the other hand I think that the men who signed the Treaty in London would welcome here a large minority against the Treaty. I feel if we were to act in the same spirit as heretofore we would see what the minority is and, if it is not enough, that we would take a bit from the majority and increase that minority for the sake of our national and international standing in the future. I think, if we went in that friendly spirit tomorrow and took stock as it were, that we could face the future unitedly and without any harshness to the other side and I think, under circumstances like that, the President and Michael Collins and Mr. Griffith could work together as in the past. I would like to develop that suggestion much more. I would like to work it out longer in the morning. MR. COLLIVET: Is the issue of the joint manifesto agreed to? Here President de Valera rising to leave said, I must beg leave to go. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER: I think there is no necessity now for the second part of that motion. MR. COLLIVET: I take it that the Cabinet will do that. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER: The Whips inform me that there is still a list of speakers who are anxious to speak (Cries of Tomorrow). MR. M. COLLINS: The Deputy from Cork made the suggestion that if the House stood adjourned the Deputies would remain to read these documents (submitted by the Committee). Some of us have seen too much of these damned documents and we don't want to see them again. In my opinion they ought not be [218] taken away. The danger would be too great. It is not that I mind a bit these documents being published. We were at any rate binding the honour of the nation not to publish them. That is the only point of view I have been speaking on with regard to these documents. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER: I think it would be a very unwise thing to take these documents out of the House. MR. LIAM DE RÓISTE: Are we to presume that the matter raised by Deputy Duggan will come up at the private session tomorrow? THE DEPUTY SPEAKER: It is being dealt with at present by the Cabinet. MR. LIAM T. COSGRAVE: Before the House adjourns, as I didn't speak today I have a suggestion to make. I understand there is a practice in vogue in America that the members of the Senate or Congress hand in their speeches and whoever wishes to read them can read them. Have we any chance of getting that done here so as to save some time? (laughter). PROFESSOR HAYES: It should be made absolutely clear that if this House adjourns and people who want to read these documents should leave them here after them, the result is achieved so far as the Committee is concerned. MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: Not so far as the country is concerned. Let them read them now and sleep on them. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER: There is a motion for the adjournment of the House before us. It has been moved and seconded. The motion was agreed to and the House adjourned at 8.50 p.m. |