.


| Home | Collins 22 Society Who we are | What we do | Membership | How you can Support | Campaigns | Events | Newsletter | Email |

 

~ The Treaty ~

The Treaty Debate 16th December 1921

On resuming after luncheon the Deputy Speaker took the Chair at 4.10 p.m.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER: I gather that the Deputies are to express their views freely on the general situation. The Whips have a number of names and I will call them in a certain order and I trust that there will be no interruptions and that when a speaker is on his feet he will be allowed to speak. When any Deputy takes exception to any remarks that may be made surely he can make a short note of it and speak afterwards. We cannot possibly get on if interruptions are to be flung across from one side of the room to the other.

MR. AUSTIN STACK: Arising out of something that happened yesterday when the Minister of Finance was informed of something that had happened in his office—the information was, I think, conveyed to the House by the Deputy for North Cork—I have here the police report with regard to the happening and I think I ought to get liberty to read it. It is with regard to the raid on the office of the Minister for Finance.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER: I say here there is no objection to that being read.

MR. STACK The following is the report:

“ROBBERY AT DÁIL FINANCE OFFICE.

A Chara, I beg to report having in conjunction with the Deputy Director of Intelligence investigated the above robbery. From examination it is quite apparent that the person or persons who entered the office secured keys by some means or other, as from examination there appears to have been no force resorted to, as the doors and locks are not damaged in any way. So far as the staff reports that no documents were removed but a small portable safe which was in a secret recess in the room, and which, I believe contained ten or eleven hundred pounds is missing. It is suggested that it was taken away in a leather case, which is also missing from the office. It is said that the safe would have fitted in this case. Apparently the intruders were very well informed, as it would be very hard for a stranger going into the office to discover the recess, and as it was opened and manipulated without force being applied it would suggest that the intruders were very well acquainted with the office routine. We interrogated some charwomen and others who have access to the building but without any success. No member of the staff can throw any light on the affair. I am informed that the sum of money removed was in fifty pound notes and the banks have been instructed in the matter with a view to tracing the robbers. Numerous documents were strewn round the floor of the office and the drawers of one desk were forced open as if the intruders were looking for documents or money. We interviewed the contractor who supplied the lock; he states that originally he supplied six keys. So far only five of those keys can be accounted for and we have failed as yet to discover who received the sixth key. This man also states that it would be impossible to pick the lock or open it by any other? [sic] device other than the key made for the lock. The only conclusion we can come to is that the intruders had a key, or else that the office door was left open by one of the staff the previous night. The whole thing is a most mysterious affair, as the staff reports no documents were missing and it is an extraordinary thing that ordinary burglars would resort to entering an office of this description in search of valuables or money. The police are still pursuing investigations. I enclose notes of Deputy Director of Intelligence”.

The notes of the Deputy Director of Intelligence read:

“The Yale lock was not forced. Entrance to office could only have been obtained by duplicate key or door was not locked when staff were leaving yesterday evening. The walls seemed to have been sounded as the paper in some places was torn off.

One open press was searched and the contents strewn about. The staff informed us that so far they have not discovered if any papers or correspondence is missing. The small safe which was kept in the recess was [197] possibly taken away in a leather bag belonging to one of the staff. The drawers of the Cabinet desk were forced open and contents scattered. But O'Connor informed us that six keys are accounted for which are in the hands of the staff. We interviewed all the staff and they can throw no light on the matter.”

That is the information that was asked for by the Deputy from North Cork last evening and now when it came to my hands I thought it better to give it.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER: If any Deputy for North Cork or Minister for Finance wishes to speak they can do so.

MR. ML. COLLINS: The reports agree exactly with the views of the man in charge of the office, Mr. George McGrath, except I think they have got information with respect to the sixth key. Just now a report will be coming along about that.

MR. P. Ó MÁILLE: Now my friends, as there are a number here who cannot speak Irish, I will try and repeat what I have said. I am glad that those papers were submitted to us today because in my humble opinion, and the common ordinary man is entitled to his opinion, your attitude and your actions here today will be judged by the man in the street. It is the man in the street who will pass judgment on you and not the logicians who are twisting words. In my humble opinion this document of President de Valera's is a far greater enemy of Republicanism in Ireland than the Treaty itself, because this document tries, as it says in the beginning, “to bring to an end the long and ruinous conflict between Gt. Britain and Ireland by a sure and lasting peace honourable to both nations.” This document is trying to tie every man, woman and child in Ireland and to take them away from the Republican ideal. If the Treaty is passed tomorrow there will be a large minority in the country against it and that party will be the nucleus of a Republican Party. In this document it is proposed under clauses 5 and 7 to form a treaty with England, an offensive and defensive treaty, and if this country is to be invaded, say by the United States, we according to this document of President de Valera's are placing ourselves in the unfortunate position that Belgium was placed in during the late war. Now my friends, there is a great deal of talk of conscience in this. Every man is entitled to his own view in that matter and we here in this Chamber are supposed to represent the views of the people who sent us here, and if we back down from their views and give votes contrary to the feelings of the people how does our conscience stand after that? I think, Sir, that as an honourable man you (the President) ought to stand down and not to vote away the lives of the people of Ireland. I think you have a grave responsibility before you and every man of you. The delegates were sent across to England, they were placed in a very awkward position, and I think instead of pillorying them here now you ought to congratulate them on the magnificent fight that they made under the circumstances. Now there is talk of reality and shadow-chasing. This document of President de Valera's is like looking for a bit of glow in the rainbow, but when you look for the rainbow you won't find the glow.

Is mairg a bhíonn go hole agus a bhíonn bocht na dhiaidh. And does any man say here that if you put this document of President de Valera's before the people of England it would be accepted in its entirety? I say there is not a man, woman or child who would believe you.

MR. SEÁN MACENTEE: I am in rather a difficulty in rising to speak now and I thought in view of the indefinite state we left the discussion this morning that we would have to consider the documents which were placed before us and to see how far they were relevant to the matter under discussion. If I tried to deal with that issue now I must necessarily restrict myself and the time of the other delegates in dealing with the Treaty itself, but since the delegate or the Deputy from Galway who has just sat down has made a reference to this document it might be no harm if I tried to place the discussion which has opened very informally and so inert and so inadequate, upon something [198] like a proper basis in regard to those documents. Those documents are very relevant and very pertinent to this issue. They are relevant, are pertinent to it in this way, because it is those documents that are to determine whether the Cabinet of the Dáil, irrespective of what the Dáil itself may do—and I hope if the Dáil Cabinet were to go wrong in this matter that there would be still left in this Assembly sufficient intelligence and strength of character to reject that Treaty upon grounds which I hope in time to have an opportunity of placing before you. These documents I say are relevant to this issue, whether the Cabinet is bound to honour the signature of the delegates or plenipotentiaries, to give them their proper title. There are those documents. Out of the mass of documents there are three that are pertinent to the discussion. First of all there is the fundamental document—a document from which all the delegates' actions and powers issue—the copy of the instructions to the plenipotentiaries. And the most important clause in that document is clause 3 of it which says, “It is also understood that the completed text of the draft treaty about to be signed will be similarly submitted to Dublin and reply awaited.” Now, Sir, that was not done and I think it has never been held by any person in this Assembly that the complete final draft of the Treaty was submitted to the Dáil Cabinet. There may have been a semi-final draft, but what is here nominated in that form is the final draft and that was not submitted. When it was not submitted the Cabinet cannot be in honour bound to honour the signature of the delegation. They may not be bound in the letter some might say, but it might possibly happen that they might be bound in the spirit and if they were I should say that in order to secure unanimity in this Dáil it might be a good thing for the Cabinet to consider whether they might not adopt the Treaty. But there are two other documents which we have to weigh and consider in order to decide how we shall stand upon that question. The first of these documents are the records of the secretary of the Cabinet. Those records may be a fair record but I ask you to remember this that they are necessarily not records. There is not one member of the Cabinet who has pledged himself by his signature that these are absolutely and exactly accurate minutes of what happened at these meetings. The great point that has been made is in regard to a certain oath. In connection with that oath I ask you also to consider the memorandum which was prepared, I believe, by the Minister of Economic Affairs at the instance of the chairman of the delegation. That memorandum purports I believe— and I am subject to correction if I have gathered a wrong impression—to express as definitely as it is possible to express it the collective impression of the delegation as to what were the views of the Cabinet upon the proposals that have been set before them—what were the views of the Cabinet as to the proposals which they wished to be laid before the British plenipotentiaries. Now, Sir, there is here in this document an oath which appears in exactly the same form to that which was recorded in the secretary's minutes and we have already heard that that oath is included in the document which is entitled, “Amendments by the Irish Representatives to the Proposed Articles of Agreement.” The oath as included in that document is only one of three drafts which were if you like not exactly laid before the Cabinet but, if they were laid, certainly not discussed and accepted as the final and considered views of the Cabinet upon the matter. But that oath appeared as part and parcel of other essential conditions, other essential clauses, which qualify every word of that oath, and that oath must be taken in context with that and cannot be taken apart and considered apart from that. Those, Sir, represent, I dare say, represent the view of that what has transpired today of one section of the delegation as to what were the Cabinet's views upon the matter; the draft treaty represents the views of the other section of the delegation as to what were the Cabinet's views upon the matter. Now, Sir, in so serious a matter as this and particularly in view of this written instruction which governed every action, I of [sic] the delegation itself was not unanimous in its view as to what were the decisions of the Cabinet that Saturday afternoon. And I say that lacking that unanimity of impression they are not entitled now—and mark my words— to sign any treaty, much less to come back here and demand as a right that the Cabinet of the Dáil should accept it. I don't say that in the very, very difficult position in which they were placed [199] they had not certain rights. They had the right to exercise their own discretion. They had the right to append their signature to that document upon their own responsibility but then they had a right—the only right they have in the House as I contended—first to come back and submit it here before the Dáil not as the instrument of the Cabinet, not as an instrument which the Cabinet is bound in honour to accept, but as an instrument which the Cabinet may consider and reject and would ask this House to reject if it so thinks fit. Now, Sir, I am afraid I shall have to deal a little longer in view of the fact that I have to try to deal with this document, and I will have to take up a little more of the time of this Assembly than I wish today, but I am going, if I may here in private, to give you the reasons why I am against this Treaty. I do not wish that anything I should say should hurt anyone here. I may say hard things about the Treaty but I do not wish —and I could not if I did—to say one hard thing about those who have signed it because it is not in my power to say it. In this matter every man must be a conscience unto himself and every man must act true to the truth as he sees it, but I say this, that everything connected with this Treaty shows that the delegates were hurried to the signing of it. In the short space of about 17 hours it was conceived, adjusted, written and signed. They were sleepless, travel-worn and care-worn men. Whatever the consequences of this Treaty —and I believe they will be very consequences [sic] indeed—the verdict of the future, when the extenuating facts are known, will indemnify the delegates, but as regards ourselves it is a very, very different case. We have time to consider. We have had time to take counsel. What we do now we do after grave and weighty deliberation and, from the consequences of our act, for us there will be no relief. I cannot think, I cannot believe, that when such consideration as that is placed before you—men who have by their devotion, by their suffering, by their valour, honoured by a glorious place in our country's history—I cannot believe that when such consideration as that is laid before them, that they will not weigh carefully every word of that document, search every clause, examine every clause and when honour and expediency conflict let honour triumph and thus remain steadfast and true for ever, the dauntless guardians of this nation's soil. It happened that last night, stung by a reference which the Assistant Minister for Local Government made to our President, I interjected, in the course of a very cutting and incisive speech, which, if he will permit me to say, made me think that the mantle of a distinguished relative of his who has played his part in Irish history—

MR. KEVIN O'HIGGINS: On a point of personal explanation, I am not a relative of Mr. Healy's.

DEPUTY SPEAKER: This has nothing whatever to do with the matter before the House.

MR. MACENTEE: I only wish—

MR. O'HIGGINS: I was not alive when Mr. Healy married my aunt.

MR. MACENTEE: If you will permit me in the best of good humour to say so, I must say that I am very very sorry that he was not alive when Mr. Healy married his aunt, otherwise he might not be here now. However, as I was going to say, stung by a reference which the Assistant Minister for Local Government made to our President I interjected a remark. That remark I freely admit was in the very worst of bad taste. I know it had absolutely no relevance to any gentleman here. I don't believe that [of] any member of this Dáil, and I wish therefore most sincerely to express regret and to apologise for it. But Sir, when I made that remark—and perhaps it was a fitting punishment for me—the member who was speaking spat out one word, “reminiscences”. And some members here thought themselves fit to take it up and cast it in my face. Well that word did awaken recollections in my mind. I remember some years ago, when a rash and impulsive boy, I applied for a commission in the British army. There are other men who held that commission who thought they were doing the best for Ireland. Something, however, made me withdraw my application. It was afterwards produced at my courtmartial and it was one of the most damning testimonies they brought against me because the construction placed on it was that I applied for it in order to be a spy in the ranks.

MR. O'KEEFFE: We are not trying [200] Mr. MacEntee for anything he did for the last 20 years.

DEPUTY SPEAKER: I am afraid he is wandering from the point.

MR. MACENTEE: If you will permit me to develop this in my own way. If a man is insulted to his face may he not have the right of reply? Is there one here who will take the same attitude towards me? Sir, something happened to change my course. I therefore threw myself into the Volunteers and I served very loyally there. There is a Deputy in this House who will tell you that with his brother I worked day and night in that corps. When a certain document was published countermanding mobilisation for the King [recte Rising] I rode from Dundalk to Dublin and saw the first President of the Irish Republic, received his orders and left Dublin at five minutes past twelve on Easter Monday, got to my men three miles from Dundalk and brought them out. And when our petrol ran out my men got through the enemy's lines, got into Earl Street, into the Post Office, left the Post Office under the order—

MR. DAN MCCARTHY: On a point of order. If we are going to have the history of the action of every man since 1916 we will be here until tomorrow morning.

MR. MACENTEE: I say it is relevant and I will show you the relevancy in a moment. I change my course and find myself inside the enemy's lines in Dublin—

DEPUTY SPEAKER: I fear I cannot allow the Deputy to continue in that strain. It has nothing to do with the subject.

MR. MACENTEE: It has. I tell you it has.

DEPUTY SPEAKER: Is it the wish of the House that he continue?

SEVERAL MEMBERS: Yes.

MR. MACENTEE: If some people will not have enough patience to hear me speak for the first time really on this question, well then it is not worth while considering the position of the country at all. I left that Post Office under the O'Rahilly's orders. I was second last in the file entering Moore Street. I rallied my men there, put a house into a position of defence and prepared to stand then, as I am prepared to stand now, for the cause of Ireland and the Republic. That was a significant change in the space of six years, and when the word “reminiscences” is spitten at me memories like that rise up to me and make me say, “Well no man can say that I am not worthy to be a member of this Dáil and to speak in this matter and put my views before you.” Now I said I would show you the relevancy of this matter later. What was it changed me about 1914? It was simply this, that Redmond in 1914 asked us to join an Irish Brigade in order that we might secure the unity of our country. When it was apparent that Redmond was about to be betrayed and that England was going through with its policy of Partition, seeing that touchstone of national unity, much nobler men, greater men, inspired me. I saw where my duty lay and, as I decided upon John Redmond's policy by this touchstone of the national unity, so I test and condemn Mr. Griffith's policy now. There are two problems with which those who try to serve their country are always faced. The first and the transcendental problem if you like is how to secure her national independence, but there is another, and I have held always that it comes first in point of time, and that is how to secure her national union. Men may differ from me that it is not a question of principle at all but a question of expediency. I, Sir, contend that you will never have by the very fact of it an independent nation until you have secured a united nation upon honourable terms. It was said the other day—yesterday—by a very eminent member of the House that he was an opportunist. So am I an opportunist who tries to serve his principles and to seize opportunities to serve and not to subvert his principles. I saw in this conference an opportunity not to secure a Republic, or even to secure Home Rule, but an opportunity to secure the union of the Irish nation. I was a strong supporter of the conference from the first. I said many things about the conference but no one can say I ever said I would accept anything from that conference that did not bring Irish union. That was to be my test. I would not have taken the oath of allegiance to the Assembly to act otherwise. They say they did support it in order to obtain [201] Irish union. I said I would never sit in an Assembly based on that conference if it entailed an oath of allegiance to the English King, and this conference and these proposals have secured neither Irish independence nor Irish union. So far from securing independence if it lies in the hearts of men in this generation to make this glorious achievement impossible—

MR. COLLIVET: He is speaking on the main line of the Treaty and we will be getting confused—now on the genesis of the Treaty and then on the Treaty itself. If this is to continue we will be here for a fortnight.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER: I understood that private members were to express their views on the general situation.

MR. SEÁN MACENTEE: I am against the proposal because I believe article 12 of the Treaty, so far from securing Irish union, makes it for ever impossible to obtain it. There are many grounds on which I might base an objection but I refer you to a speech of the Prime Minister of England on Wednesday afternoon. In that he said, in reference to article 12, that they considered and that the friends of Ulster thought it desirable that if Ulster was to remain a separate unit it was desirable that some alteration should be made in her boundaries, and he went on to define what in his view the alteration should be. He said it would be to remove from under her jurisdiction certain people and districts over which the Government of Northern Ireland can never rule and substitute for them certain other districts, Monaghan, Cavan and Donegal. That is what is meant to Ulster delegates—certain other districts over which a new Order in Parliament can be made effective and which will give to the Northern Parliament a population which is essential in order that here should be planted or established in Ireland a second race and people who will be the inveterate and relentless enemy of the indigenous nation. I heard the remark. “Nonsense”. Let him who made that remark refer to the debates in the House of Commons and he will see plainly stated in article 12, if it is accepted by this nation, can be done in the spirit of the man who is forcing the Treaty on us and can also force his interpretation on us. If that is to be interpreted in Lloyd George's spirit, and it will be so interpreted, we are going to erect in Ulster, and we are going to give to the Ulster people the title deeds for a fortress of Orangeism and Unionism that will hold Ireland for England as surely as Gibraltar holds the Mediterranean for them. And that is my great objection to this Treaty. I ask you to consider and weigh it. We have been told in this House that there is a certain element which was not represented here. The eminent gentleman who occupied the Chair had taken that as his especial charge. I wish to speak of the same elements but with a closer intimacy with their real views on this matter. I was born and lived in Belfast until six months ago. Do the people of Belfast and those six counties know the real object and purpose of this Treaty? I don't say, mind you, that it is the purpose of the chairman of the delegation, but it is the purpose of the men who fashioned this Treaty and wrote the draft of it, the English Prime Minister, that man who said they could not deal with the Irish situation until Ireland was faced with the accomplished rights of Ulster, and that man who kept this country in a swelter of blood and suffering for the last eighteen months, when long ago public opinion in England was ripe for a settlement, in order that he might set up an Ulster fortress. That, Treaty or no Treaty, is going to bind Ireland to England forever. I speak for the people near Belfast and if they knew the inwardness of that Treaty, no matter what you in Ireland would do, there would come from them a cry that you might save them. Reject the Treaty for ever, not to save the people of Belfast, but your own country which will be destroyed if this Treaty is honoured by you.

MR. LIAM DE RÓISTE: I rise as due in public opinion in support of the Treaty, and I wish to explain in the first instance my personal position. It seems to me that you have come to this in this Assembly that we must all explain our personal position. I deny here that in a public interview which I gave to the press I I praised the terms. I defined the issue and by that I stand. The circumstances under which I got the outline are quite simple. I had not the draft Treaty before me. I got it from a newspaper office. I made no comment and gave no consideration to the [202] three or four first parts of the Treaty as outlined to me but when it came to the point that the British forces were to be withdrawn from this country within a short time I said to the man who asked for my views, “I will give you my views now.” Apart from all walls of words about states or international situations or interpretations in the minds of English or Irish delegates or the Cabinet or the Dáil the concrete fact in my mind is that for 750 years there have been armed forces holding this country, and if they get out, as I said to myself, I don't mind saying it in the Dáil, in vulgar words, “the English can go to hell.” I want to say also, as our personal positions are challenged, that I hold the same opinions now as since I was about four years of age.

A MEMBER: You must be childish.

MR. DE RÓISTE: I don't know whether, in my childish imagination, in building sand castles I always had Finn MacCool driving the English out of Ireland. When I said that in an outline of what would be the effects of this Treaty was the fact of coming to an agreement that the English armed forces would get out of this country, I said that is the idea we have been looking for. Further, and I find now particularly in the last three or four days that I was living in a fools' paradise. I understood always that the people were our masters and I understood in my ignorance that the Dáil were the masters of the Cabinet, that they are the Government of this country, and with that idea in my mind I considered that what was brought before us in Dáil meetings in the last session, and in the session prior [to] that particularly, were the instructions which we as a body were giving to our plenipotentiaries who went to London. I knew of no divisions in the Cabinet or of what I held to be the Government of the country. All I knew is what this Dáil, looking at it as the sovereign Assembly of the nation, has instructed our delegates to accept. Had a thunderbolt from heaven fallen at my feet I could not have been more surprised than when I read the statement of President de Valera last week in the papers. I can understand the attitude adopted by Miss MacSwiney and Mr. MacDonagh in cavilling at or controverting anything that the delegates did, because those two Deputies at the last session of the Dáil and the session prior to that wanted the hands of the plenipotentiaries tied. All the rest of us in this Dáil accepted what was put before us by the united Cabinet—and I presume it was united then. We accepted the idea definitely and it was put to a vote that the plenipotentiaries be given a free hand in the negotiations. I myself in fact was responsible at the session prior to the last session for putting that to the Dáil and I did so having the greatest confidence in the Cabinet of the Dáil. The President asked that the motion I put be accepted as a vote of confidence in or censure on the Cabinet, and he stated that the Cabinet, though elected only that morning, would resign if the motion was not carried. The motion was quite clear in my own mind and, as I thought, in accordance with what the President and the Cabinet wanted, namely, that the delegates or plenipotentiaries should go over to treat with the English and do the best they could under the circumstances in which they were placed. I hold therefore that this Dáil gave in that motion, and subsequently when the point was raised, the instructions to the delegates. What was done by the Cabinet, whether it split or did not split, whether one man had one view and another man had another view, is in my view quite irrelevant to this issue; it is nothing to us in the Dáil, as ordinary representatives in the country, all this thing which has gone on during the past three days, what these men say or think, or what letters were sent or were not sent. We sent our plenipotentiaries with certain instructions from the Dáil on very general lines and we must accept the consequences ourselves. The private session went on last evening and for an entirely different purpose. No matter what disagreements of opinion are here, if the Cabinet of the Dáil is to regard itself—and I speak of it as the one body who is to regard itself as the Government of this country—it should take immediate steps now to govern the country. What I refer to is this. We are passing through a crisis. We were plunged and the public were plunged at once, they thought, into wild differences of opinion which I, even now after three days' whirl of words, I don't understand. The Government of the country is being plunged at present into wild whirling statements which are leading to acts, and unless we have some authority in this country, some direction from the [203] Cabinet, which in our view stands as the Government of the country, this country, whether we ratify or reject the Treaty, is going to be plunged into chaos. And I ask, in order to get rid of that, at this private session which will not be stated at the public one I ask and appeal, if the appeal of a private member is of any importance, now to the members of the Cabinet as a body to take steps. Even now to try and in some way reassure the public mind so that the Republican party at least—although other parties in the country may do and armed forces—may not be split into two fractions. I should have thought it would have been their duty to do that first before presenting us here with this Treaty. Now, Mr. Speaker and members of the Dáil, we look at this as the Parliament. That has been our attitude. In the circumstances of the country in the last few years it was a justifiable attitude when we were fighting the English. But I should also like to remind the members of the Assembly that there is no assembly in the world, and I don't suppose there ever has been, composed simply of one party and I maintain that this Assembly is still composed of only one party and that is the Republican Party of Ireland. If we are divided because of our opinions on this Treaty with England it is not so much the country you are dividing, it is the Republican Party of Ireland that you are dividing. There are different sections and different parties in this country still. We are failing to realise that there are still what used to be termed constitutionalists and unionists and we are failing to realise that there are labour elements in the country, that this is still a nation with its different parties and different sets of ideas. If we split into different opinions on the Treaty it is not so much perhaps the country in that sense as the Republican Party in Ireland. Every man in this Assembly has a dual capacity; he has personal ideas and opinions and ideals and wants to try and square what we are presented with with those ideas and opinions. If that were the only consideration we could divide quite easily, I should think, because I believe, having still faith in the declarations we have made, that every man is honest and that we have all only one opinion. But the more paramount interest is not our own personal prejudices or ideas and personal principles. The paramount interest is what are we going to do for the people who sent us here. Some of us who stood at the 1918 election stood against other parties and by a majority of votes were elected, and it is in the interest of the people that elected me that I am concerned with and not with my own personal ideas or that I said one thing at one time and another thing at another time. I know their feelings and views on the Treaty as it appeared. They may be wrong feelings and views because as I see now they did not have the full facts before them. But before we come to an actual decision on this Treaty in public or private I should like to impress on every member of the Dáil who is not already prejudiced—I am not using the word “prejudice” as any term of reproach but perhaps it would be better to use the term “leaning on one side”—what I should like to impress on each member is that the paramount interests on which we must decide the question are the interests of the people, the interests of the majority of the people. You can have no order in the country if you don't have democratic rule, that the majority rule must prevail, otherwise you have chaos in every country. You will have chaos unless you have in every country some kind of rule to apply and the rule of balance should be the rule of the majority and it should be the object to consider only the people; and it is the interests of the poor, the weak and the lowly of the people who have been crushed down that I consider first and not my own ideas, prejudices and biases. What I fear most, and that is why I ask as a humble member that the Cabinet to whom we have looked for guidance in the affairs of this country should consider some method of preventing what we shall term a split. What I have most at heart is this, that we should not be put in the position, whether we accept or reject the Treaty, that the Republican Party and the other parties and the people should be put fighting amongst themselves with armed Orangemen in the north who would care to take advantage of that, or with armed, as we used to say, Bolshevists trying to take advantage, and with the English as good lookers-on trying to defeat each separately that they might defeat us all by and by. These things are of some consideration for the Cabinet of this country; and the Dáil, whether a letter was written one day or another or whether this was interpreted this way or the other, should as one stand independent between one side of the [204] Cabinet and the other. I say the Cabinet was wanting in its duty to the Dáil and to the country when it did not consider those things before the plenipotentiaries were sent as to what would be the consequences either of acceptance or rejection or of a break over in London itself, and I think it may not be too late yet for them to consider the consequences whether we accept or reject, because as I have said the paramount interests for them as here should be consideration for the whole people of the country and not points of phrases and words. We came up here from the country, many of us, many like myself, knowing nothing of differences in the Cabinet—we came and in the first public session we were plunged into a whirl of words which was not to the honour of the Dáil or the Cabinet as a body, or of the whole people, that we should be presented the very first day in the public press as such a disorganised and disordered body—no rule of procedure, no ordered debate, words bandied across tables and things like that before the people of Ireland and the world. These things should have been considered beforehand. We came prepared to discuss the Treaty on its merits, at least I did, and instead of that, for three days, first in public and afterwards in private, we have not been discussing this Treaty at all; we have been hearing opinions and views privately. It might have been well for the Dáil and for the country had we heard all the private views previously. We hear them now for the first time. Those are not the relevant questions. The good order and government of this country through any crisis whether we are faced with the English forces in the country ready to fight again or with the clearing out of the English forces in this country, and perhaps our own people ready to fight among one another, that is the relative [recte relevant] question, and the other relative [recte relevant] question which I presume will be placed before us tomorrow is the acceptance or rejection of the Treaty.

 

COUNTESS MARKIEVICZ: I wish to state in the first place the attitude I take between the Treaty and the document put in by President de Valera. To begin with the Treaty, I shall not say much about it but I want to say a word first because I cannot discuss the other without mentioning it. When I saw the first copy of the Treaty it came to me like a bolt from the blue. I had no more expected that the plenipotentiaries would have agreed to the Oath of Allegiance to the King of England than that I should have agreed to it myself. I believed too that going as they did as envoys from the Irish Republic such a thing would have been impossible for them to agree to without ratification of it on the larger scale—ratification from the country. That is where I take my stand as to that document taking it as a whole, and that is precisely where I will have to consider President de Valera's document. I am a Republican, I won't say a die-hard, I say an undying Republican, and to me, in that Treaty, you absolutely and deliberately by swearing an oath to the King of England, put the Republic behind you. You, as it were, pledge yourself to an authority other than the Irish Republic. In the document that the President puts forward there are many disagreeable things but there is no giving up of the Republican position. As a Republic you can make treaties, and [are] in a position where it is quite fair to discuss beforehand the sort of treaty you are to make with England, a sort of limitation of sovereignty of Ireland, to discuss such bitter pills as Spain had to discuss when she gave up Gibraltar to the English. We in such a way ought to discuss the giving up of our ports and other things to England. But that is a totally different thing from swearing an oath of fealty to the English King and I say again that will never do. I will swallow any humiliation but I will not do a thing which I would consider dishonest, first, before God and my own soul and, secondly, before the men who died for Ireland in all the generations and, thirdly, to my constituency in St. Patrick's and the poor and the humble. They are nearly all poor now and each one has said to me, “You will be true to the Republic.” I have expressed my opinion without going into details of the two documents why I could consider that of the President and could not consider that of the delegation. I am not making any personal allusion to anyone in Ireland and I wish to say that I hope that the end of this long disagreement in which we have all taken part will be that we can all work together for the good of Ireland. I hope the delegates will realise that, while I disagree with them, I understand and can sympathise with them, for they did their best in a difficult position to do what they thought [205] right for Ireland, and that I will not try to do anything mean or underhand in my attitude, that I will put aside everything but principle in trying to work with them whichever way the matter goes and, while I express loyalty to President de Valera as President of the Irish Republic by which I stand, I can only hope that they on their side will exercise some leniency towards Ireland. If we don't get now some compromise, some loyal pledge that we can stand all together in the name of the dead and of Ireland, we shall break up all that has been done, ruin the cause for which so many have risked their lives, for which our men died and were tortured, and I appeal to the Dáil, let us clean our dirty linen in private, and if not get to the bottom of things, try to get into some position from which we can fight the enemy. I have stated my position and I hope we will be able to do the best we can for Ireland, to work for Ireland together, being loyal to the points of view that God has given us. I ask you to be quite loyal and true to what you believe is right and if we do that I think we shall throw the enemy out of our country. I shall have more to say on the Treaty tomorrow, but this is not the time to say it.

MR. ALEC MACCABE: I may say at the outset that I admired very much the sentiments expressed by the last speaker and I compliment her on the effort she is making to secure a united effort by the representatives of Ireland to secure the country against a split or against the consequences of a split in Dáil Éireann. My opinion, my views always were Republican. I always had the greatest faith in the leaders and the members individually and collectively in the Cabinet, the men we entrusted with carrying out this fight to success. Until today I had some doubt in my mind as to what the issues really were. A good many of us thought that on one side were the people for ratification of this Treaty and that on the other were the uncompromising Republicans. I may say that on reading some documents submitted to us today I am completely disillusioned. Now I know what most of you in the Dáil know, that the people who are honestly and sincerely out for accepting the goods as delivered by Lloyd George are on one side and on the other side are a number of people, a number of Teachtaí including Madame Markievicz. The great majority possibly [are] people honestly and sincerely devoted to the ideal of an Irish Republic and are going to be consistent in pursuit of that ideal to the very end. I admire these people and none of the people who are in agreement with me or have the same views as I have on this Treaty have anything else but sincere admiration for them. Another part of the opposition is made up of people who accept President de Valera's alternative scheme. There is no use in describing that scheme and telling the intelligent people that he represents that if it is realised that it is a Republic. I deny emphatically that any state in which the legislature or members of the legislature or members of the Cabinet or of the Government have to swear allegiance to a foreign potentate or monarch is by any stretch of the imagination or could by any stretch of the imagination be described as a Republic. My views as I say were, I don't think, properly made up until I saw this document but now I think that it is up to us to face the facts as they are, and my decision is, I have taken it now, is that I shall vote for the acceptance of the Treaty, and I do it for these reasons. Before I go on to the Treaty I must explain my position. I regard myself still, and even after I vote for this Treaty, as a Republican and an uncompromising Republican. I may be inconsistent by voting for it or in taking the Oath but I am not sacrificing my principle and I refuse to concede to anyone who says that I am giving up the ideal of a Republic. I refuse to concede it. I don't agree with anyone who says that by voting for the acceptance of this Treaty that it compromises in any way the chances of Ireland ultimately securing a Republic. As regards my views on the question of the delegation and their action in London my views are these, that Dáil Éireann gave these people the instructions when they voted on the motion, that Dáil Éireann entrusted these people with full powers as plenipotentiaries when they sanctioned their appointment and sent them across to negotiate with Lloyd George. Everyone present at that Dáil meeting clearly understood what that meant and no one put the question as clearly and forcibly as the President himself when he said that he himself would face the country on the proposals these delegates brought back from London, that he would take responsibility for putting them himself before the [206] country. There is a lot of talk about the question of whether the delegates exceeded their instructions. These delegates were in a very difficult position. There is a tide in the affairs of nations as in the affairs of men which when taken at flood time often results in a great advantage to the country.

MR. MACCABE: On the question of whether there was morality or otherwise in following the instructions given to them by the President, as men that we entrusted I think they had a perfect right to affix their signatures even despite the instruction given them by the President. There is a famous occasion on which a British admiral gave instructions to his commander of a second fleet to withdraw from the battle. We know that the admiral of this second fleet, when he saw the signal to retire from the fight, turned his blind eye to the signal and went into the battle and won it and saved the British Empire. These men were in something the same position as this commander of the second fleet and though he acted despite the order of the admiral and contrary to instructions, the commander was right. In the same way history will justify the action of these men in taking the tide, as I call it, at its flood. I will come to the matter of the Treaty. With regard to Mr. Childers' comment on President de Valera's alternative scheme, he spoke about guarantees. I think we have guarantees under this arrangement which are much more substantial than any guarantees under the alternative arrangement. Here are three guarantees I think any of us can accept. One is a British colonial conference. He asked what people were to arbitrate in case of a dispute regarding the reading of the terms of this Treaty. There are three courts of appeal you could have recourse to. One is the British colonial conference which for the sake of their own interests and not to jeopardise their own position will be always on the side of Ireland wherever Ireland's rights are questioned by England. The second is the League of Nations and we have the assurance from Mr. Lloyd George given to Mr. Griffith that Ireland will be admitted to the League of Nations. In any case by her position and status in the British Empire she is entitled to that beyond yea or nay without recommendation from Mr. Lloyd George. Immediately she enters the League of Nations she secures unquestionably international status which will permit of all differences between Ireland and Gt. Britain being referred to an international court. Thirdly, we have the most effective and reliable guarantee of all, and that is the army which is going to take possession of this country when the British forces leave in a month's time. I am not a great admirer of the Treaty but the one thing which has brought conviction to me and has appealed to me is the fact of the Free State of Ireland passing over into the control of the armed forces of the Irish Free State—into the armed forces of Ireland. Mr. Childers referred to the use of one word which I have no doubt about for myself in this Assembly. The word was that when speaking about a peaceful nation he used the word, “Never”. I say that a famous Irishman used the words that no one can put bounds to the march of a nation and that word is as true today as ever and as true after this Treaty is signed because nothing we will do will ever retard the advance of Ireland towards the ideal she has set herself to achieve, namely an Irish Republic. I vote for this Treaty but I will be a Republican and will continue to pursue the ideals of a Republic as long as I am in public life. On the question of principle there is another principle which has greatly influenced me in coming to this decision and it is the principle of faithfully representing the views of my constituents. I took great trouble to ascertain those views and I found that they were almost unanimously in favour of ratification. Before this Treaty was signed, before these goods were shown to the country, we might have secured the help and cooperation of the country in fighting it out to a finish. Now that the goods are delivered [207] and that they are good goods under the circumstances I have no doubt whatsoever but that the country would accept them, if they were placed before them, by a majority of ten to one. That is all I have to say about it.

ALDERMAN JOSEPH MACDONAGH: It is mostly in reply to a statement made by the Deputy for Cork, Liam de Róiste, that has compelled me to speak. He stated that at the last public session in August I tried to stipulate that the hands of the Deputies [recte delegates] should be tied. I never stipulated anything of the sort. What I did stipulate was that terms of reference should be drawn up for the plenipotentiaries.

MR. MCKEON: I should like to ask if these are to be regarded as private members of the Dáil?

PRESIDENT DE VALERA: He is not a minister of the Cabinet but by private members it was intended to distinguish those responsible for policy from other members. Ministers who are not members of the Cabinet should be included in this debate.

MR. MCKEON: He said private members' views.

PRESIDENT DE VALERA: We agreed last night on private members and I think Mr. Griffith meant the same thing.

ALDERMAN MACDONAGH: I might point out to the member for Longford that the Minister for Labour has spoken and no objection was raised. It was stated by the member for Cork that I tried to stipulate at the last session in August that the hands of the delegates should be tied. I tried to make no such stipulation. I did say that the terms of reference should be supplied to the plenipotentiaries by the Dáil and in making that stipulation I said there were two questions which were outstanding and which the Dáil would never agree to no matter what the plenipotentiaries brought back, and that these two questions were allegiance and partition. That is what I said. However it was decided unanimously that the terms of reference and instruction—I am open to correction on this—would be given to the plenipotentiaries by the Cabinet—

A VOICE: No.

ALDERMAN MACDONAGH: And I absolutely agreed with that and at the last meeting when the plenipotentiaries were actually appointed I remember a speech made by another Deputy from Cork. Miss MacSwiney, who made it very definite as to what terms of reference the plenipotentiaries were concerned. She stated definitely that they went as representing the Irish Republic and that the status of the Irish Republic should not be interfered with and she asked those who were prepared to compromise to state their views on it, or for ever remain silent, and not one man or woman in the Dáil opened his or her mouth. Mr. de Róiste states that the thing that is going to affect him most is that the British forces will clear out of Ireland. I don't admit that what he states will happen. So long as our harbours are kept by the English, so long will they maintain forces to defend them. They may bring in thousands of troops to the different ports that are mentioned. And he states he does not want Ireland put in the position of Belgium. If he does not I cannot understand what he is thinking about when he says so in view of the fact that in time of war England might utilise such harbour and other facilities as she deems fit in order to protect herself from any foreign foe.

ALDERMAN MACDONAGH: Then it was some other member. I am certain if England requires it under this Treaty she will be able to run trains, take up transport and take up the whole resources of this country, and in every foreign war we will be as much involved as Belgium was in the late war. Mr. MacCabe made one unhappy quotation. He made two, but I will only refer to one. He referred to Nelson putting his blind eye to the telescope. It was a good job it was not the blind eye he put to the microscope which we were told we were to look through for principle. It is extraordinary when a man talks about principle that he should talk about putting a blind eye to the telescope. We want our eyes open to look at this Treaty. You stipulate it would be the blind eye he would look through. Mr. MacCabe tells us he is an uncompromising Republican willing to take the Oath of Allegiance to a [208] foreign King. That is the most extraordinary statement ever made. He talks about principle and he is talking about being an uncompromising Republican. I think he should follow in the footsteps of another speaker who said that he was an uncompromising opportunist. He also states that no matter what we do Ireland will achieve her independence. It is not by abandoning principle we will achieve our independence. It is not by doing nothing and giving way at the first blast by England that we will achieve anything. We have heard enough talk in the last forty years about Ireland getting her independence by Redmond and people of that sort and we are getting back to the idea to give way, compromise, climb down, abandon principle and leave it to other generations of Irishmen to achieve independence. For the sake of duty everyone should take the Oath of Allegiance to the Irish Republic and you cannot compromise on that by talking another oath with reservations and every honest man and woman should keep an oath and they cannot keep it if they are going to take another. Which are you going to abide by? If you abide by the Treaty, do it honourably or not at all. Don't say that you are going to take one oath and at the same time take another one.

A DEPUTY: What about Hertzog?

ALDERMAN MACDONAGH: I am not worrying about Hertzog. I am worrying about this country. Mr. de Róiste also talks about the Republican Party being split up into two natural divisions. There is no split on the question of principle—it is neither principle nor expediency. Anyone who is a convinced Republican cannot adopt the expedients offered in this Treaty. I am against the ratification of the Treaty.

MR. M. COLLINS: Could not such speeches as that be made more profitably in public? Is there any reason for such speeches in private? I thought they were only going to say things about the Treaty.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER: I am only following the agenda for this meeting. The third item on the agenda is that private members can express their views on the general situation.

MR. M. COLLINS: I thought we all understood it was the Treaty. I don't see any reason for a speech like that to be made in private and again in public. It is a most important speech for the public session. I should like everyone in Ireland to hear it.

ALDERMAN MACDONAGH: Other members were allowed to state their views on the Treaty. Mr. MacCabe and Mr. de Róiste went into a discussion and I don't see why I should be prevented.

MR. M. COLLINS: I raise the point of order simply. It should have been made before.

MR. DE RÓISTE: I am not conscious that I touched on questions of acceptance or rejection.

MR. JAMES DOLAN: To my mind the question most laboured by Mr. MacDonagh on principle and expediency does not arise on the two treaties that have been put before us in this Dáil. Both of these treaties give away a certain amount of principle. When we appointed our plenipotentiaries at our meeting in September I at least understood what were the terms of reference and what we sent these men to London to do, and I am not going to rise now and turn on them and say they did not carry out the instructions they got. They were sent by this Dáil in connection with the form of association that is the British Empire, to find how best the national interests of Ireland could be served in that association, and I maintain that we made no mistake in the choice of our delegates. They have done their duty nobly and well. I am not in love with all the terms of this Treaty. I don't say that and I am sure it is not what any of us would take if we were free to get a better form, but we must remember what we were up against and what we decided to do. Let us not now be rounding on the men we put into that position because they have done what we sent them to do. Now there is great talk here about the Oath that has been inserted in this Treaty and which the members of the Government of the Free State are asked to take. There is great argument made on this Oath. I will read the Oath in order to refresh the memory of everybody. “I do solemnly swear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State as by law established and that I will be faithful to H.M. King [209] George V, his heirs and successors by law, in virtue of the common citizenship of Ireland with Great Britain and her adherence to and membership of the group of nations forming the British Commonwealth of Nations”. To my mind that Oath is no different in substance to the oath suggested by our President when giving his last recommendation to these men going to the council chamber to tussle with the delegates of the British Empire. There is no difference in substance. There may be a difference in words and [recte as] we are told by the President here when he first spoke against the ratifications of this Treaty in this Assembly. We are told that the difference was very little, merely a shadow, but that he was prepared to make or break on that shadow. I put it to you, the representatives of the people of this country, are you prepared, as the Minister of Defence has said we will have to do, are you prepared to ask the men and women of Ireland to stand up and fight for— what?—for a shadow? For a quibble of words, I say, not for a principle. There is an oath in any form of association with Ireland and the British Empire—it is agreed by all the spokesmen here and our friends and representatives abroad. The member for one of the Dublin constituencies has said that he was an uncompromising Republican from boyhood and it is a way out for him. This new form of association proposed was a way out for our representative in France. I say it is only a way in for men who are afraid to face the facts as they are now put up to them. In any form of association that Ireland is connected with the British Empire it is agreed by this section that the King would be recognised as the head of it. To make it light some of them said he would be a king or chairman, but in any case they recognise that he is the head of it and the king of it. They also make light of that point. But in any association Ireland is there and I am sure that the representatives of this country and the men and women of this country will still be loyal to the Irish Constitution. They will be faithful. They have sworn allegiance to the Irish Constitution. If we are faithful to the Irish Constitution by our oaths and if Ireland is associated in any way with the British Empire, or with any association in the Commonwealth, are not the people of Ireland committed to that Constitution and to the head of it? The country is as much committed in any association put before us in this Treaty and I say that the men who worded or secured the wording of this Treaty in difficult debates and negotiations are worthy of the trust we placed in them. I say more. They interpreted the instructions they got from the Cabinet as published for us in these reports. In plain reading these reports will say that they got a mandate from the Cabinet to accept what they have accepted. As I said at the start I don't like this Treaty and if we had conquered England I would not accept it, but we must recognise the fact that we have not yet beaten England to the ropes and we were all agreed that we would enter into association with England and I maintain that the association proposed to us in this Treaty is an honourable association for us to accept. There are many points I should like to make but perhaps they would be best left unsaid to the public session. A few of them might not be out of place now in reminding the members that the difference between the signed Treaty and the proposed treaty is very little. But the main fact is that one Treaty is signed by the representatives of the British Government and the other will not be signed I believe until the blood of the men and women of Ireland runs red again. Now, we have been speaking of the Constitution of Ireland and what limitations would be put on it or what construction would be put on it by what is the constitutional usage. Like the Minister of Finance I am satisfied to leave the interpretation of these constitutional words to be solved by the high constitutional lawyers and to accept what is the plain meaning of them as a fact which has been said by one of the opponents of this Treaty. Mr. Erskine Childers in a very laboured statement took this point as a strong point against the ratification of the Treaty, but he was fair enough to point out that altho' constitutional law might be one thing fact and act and what happens every day in regard to Canada was possible and must happen in reference to the Irish Constitution that we are getting by the terms of this Treaty. Constitutional usage then is a term that will apply I say in the interests of Ireland and the acceptance of this Treaty does not make the ideal of a Republic impossible, but I say the acceptance of this Treaty makes it more possible than the rejection of it. We will have freedom to establish here a Gaelic [210] state. We can build up on the traditions of the past within this Constitution which is now offered to us by our plenipotentiaries. We can build up from within on this good and sound structure, and in the framing of our constitutional law within the terms of this Treaty there is nothing to prevent us from becoming an isolated Republic even within the association of the British Empire.

MRS. O'CALLAGHAN: I may be under a wrong impression and there are certain points I should like to have cleared up for my benefit. Am I in order? I want a point cleared up. This morning we heard a great deal about oaths, but to my mind the oath that matters to us is the Oath in the Treaty. That Oath says that we swear allegiance to the Irish Free State and an Oath to be faithful to King George in virtue of our common citizenship of Great Britain and membership of the British Commonwealth group.

MR. KEVIN O'HIGGINS: It is not that we swear it but that members of the Free State swear it.

MRS. O'CALLAGHAN: It is for information I am looking. I am not going to say what I will do tomorrow but I will be quite clear. I understand that that Oath of Allegiance to the Free State was the oath of subjects that we would take in honour of the Free State except that it was an oath of fidelity in virtue of common citizenship to the head of the Government. I find that Mr. Lloyd George in his speech on Wednesday says that under the Treaty he has secured an Oath of Allegiance to the British King and the British Empire. I want to know what to do about it. Mr. Churchill says the same. How are we to interpret article 4?

DR. FERRAN: Refer it to a constitutional lawyer as to our position under the Treaty and the application of the Oath. It is a reasonable suggestion. We are not lawyers.

MR. J.J. WALSH: Before consulting any external lawyer we might do the common courtesy to our own lawyers who have been intimately associated with us and who will discuss it in all the details. There were two of them associated with us and they will be kind enough to consider the question.

MR. GRIFFITH: The constitutional lawyers associated with the plenipotentiaries were Mr. John O'Byrne, Mr. Nolan Whelan and Professor Murnaghan. They are the constitutional lawyers.

MR. ML. HAYES: Professor Murnaghan was quoted as one. He explained to me that point Mrs. O'Callaghan raised.

MR. M. COLLINS: I think Mr. Duggan took a legal opinion from him on it. He could give the opinion.

MR. E. DUGGAN: I did. It was my own opinion also. Members of Parliament are required to swear an Oath of Allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State. This is the one thing absolutely clear about the Oath. They then say they will be faithful to the King and his successors, not absolutely and unconditionally, but by virtue of the common citizenship of Ireland with Gt. Britain and her adherence to the group of nations forming the British Commonwealth. That is the legal interpretation. It is the opinion of one of the lawyers working with us in connection with the delegation.

MR. AUSTIN STACK: Professor Murnaghan is the man who refused to take a brief for our side in connection with the proceedings which we intended to take to challenge the legality, according to British law, of martial law. I have taken the opinion of Mr. Arthur Clery on the Oath. He is a man whose nationality cannot be questioned and whose bravery cannot be questioned because he has acted as one of our judges from the commencement. His opinion was to the effect that this Oath was at least as binding in allegiance to the English King as the simple oath that is taken by the members of Parliament at the present day.

DR. FERRAN: I have taken Mr. Crowley's opinion on it.

MR. AUSTIN STACK: And here is the opinion of Mr. Winston Churchill.

MR. GRIFFITH: There is a personal reference [by] the Minister of Home Affairs to a member of the committee and in contrast with him he has put up the opinion of another gentleman. Is it the fact that the other gentleman who has taken [211] that oath of allegiance to the Republic as a judge of our High Court, as a matter of fact has practised in the English courts and signed by virtue of the King's writ?

MR. STACK: Certainly the same as any lawyer—the same as Mr. Duggan every time he issues a writ.

MR. GRIFFITH: Mr. Duggan has not been appointed a supreme judge of the court of the Republic.

Previous | Next

To enquire about the Collins 22 Society, please contact Bill Martin, National organiser at info@generalmichaelcollins.com. To become a member of the Society please visit our memberships page.

This site is maintained by the "Collins 22 Society" - email info@generalmichaelcollins.com