THE SPEAKER: I noticed a document posted up when we assembled here today and I was going to direct the Clerk of the Dáil to remove it, but I see it has been removed already. Under the circumstances I do not propose to make any inquiries as to how it came there. I take it for granted no member of the Dáil is in any way connected with the putting up of that document. Had it not been removed I would have directed the Clerk to remove it.
MR. J.J. O'KELLY: I am afraid, Mr. Speaker, that nobody has heard you.
THE SPEAKER: I will now ask Mr. Michael Hayes to give the statement of the committee with regard to the documents.
MR. MICHAEL HAYES: As arranged by the committee eight documents were prepared and they are ready for distribution amongst the members. The documents are typed and, while they can be circulated amongst the members of the Dáil, they cannot be given to the press or to anybody outside the Dáil. Therefore the documents are distributed to the members of the Dáil on the express condition that they shall be returned after perusal and examination by the members. It will be clear to any member who gets these documents that he is getting them on the express condition that he gets them from the Clerk of the House and will return them to the Clerk of the House. They are got ready in bundles at the end of the table and the arrangement made by the Clerk is that the members will go down and get the documents and make sure that they have eight documents, and their names will be ticked off. Later on they will return the documents in the same way. There will thus be a check on the distribution and return of the documents. You will get the documents immediately if you go down in file for them. In addition to these there is also another—a letter from Mr. Lloyd George to Mr. Griffith. It will be given out later; it is a separate thing. Every member should make sure he gets eight documents on the clear understanding that he has got to give them back and regard them as private..
MR. F. FAHY: On a point of order, I should like to draw attention to a note at the foot of this paper we got stating that those who wish to speak on the motion for ratification at the public session should hand in their names to the Whips. I would suggest that every member of the Dáil has a perfect right to speak. I presume three-fourths of the Dáil will wish to speak and give their reasons in public for their vote for or against (Hear, hear).
THE SPEAKER THE SPEAKER
THE SPEAKER: With regard to that, I cannot read into it that there is any suggestion that anyone should not speak. As I understand this note it is made entirely in the interests of the members of the Dáil and to enable them to make the most effective arrangements for speaking. If it conflicts with the rights of the members of the Dáil to speak in any way I would be very glad to receive communications on the point from any member. I am quite certain it was not intended to conflict with the right of the members to speak.
MR. F. FAHY MR. F. FAHY
MR. F. FAHY: I will take your assurance on that. There was another point I wanted to refer to regarding those documents. A good deal of information has got [181] to the press in one way or another and, while not wishing to impugn the honour of any member of the House, I would suggest that as regards every member he or she should put their names on the document.
COUNTESS MARKIEVICZ COUNTESS MARKIEVICZ
COUNTESS MARKIEVICZ: I beg to second that. As regards handing in names I object because it is so inefficiently done. I handed in my name to speak to the suggestion of the President and I was not called upon.
MR. D. CEANNT MR. D. CEANNT
MR. D. CEANNT: If we handed in our names the particular member whose name would be called would have to speak at a particular time. I would much prefer it would be left to the members who could stand up when they heard another member making a statement and perhaps contradict or give his views on it (Cries of No, no).
DR. MACCARTAN DR. MACCARTAN
DR. MACCARTAN: I would like to know who are the Whips. Does it mean one has to take sides in advance? Are there Whips this side of the House and that side of the House? I feel there are plenty like myself who do not belong to either side.
MISS MARY MACSWINEY MISS MARY MACSWINEY
MISS MARY MACSWINEY: With regard to the speeches, I notice my name is down as having a desire to speak. I am quite sure it was not the only one. I think I had temerity to suggest to the Speaker that if possible it should be arranged that I should speak towards the end because my speech is mainly an appeal to this Assembly for unity. I also feel I have expressed my views more than once and it is up to every private member of the Dáil now to express his or her view before I give my views again.
THE SPEAKER THE SPEAKER
THE SPEAKER: The names of the Whips are Deputies Liam Mellowes, Seán T. O'Kelly. Michael Staines and D. McCarthy. It does not matter to which of them you give your names as far as I understand.
PRESIDENT DE VALERA PRESIDENT DE VALERA
PRESIDENT DE VALERA: It was I suggested this programme to Mr. Griffith last night and I would like to explain my intention. The point is there will be at the public session a set debate. There will be a programme arranged. The motion is to be proposed by Mr. Griffith and he will have to make some arrangement for seconding and so on. He will have to get speakers. Similarly on our side—that is the side for the rejection of the Treaty—we will have to make arrangements for the principal speakers. That is all that is intended—to give those who intend to speak adequate time for preparation.
MR. M.P. COLLIVET MR. M.P. COLLIVET
MR. M.P. COLLIVET: It will facilitate matters if as many members as possible will hand in their names.
PRESIDENT DE VALERA PRESIDENT DE VALERA
PRESIDENT DE VALERA: That is the idea exactly.
MR. CATHAL BRUGHA MR. CATHAL BRUGHA
MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: Before we go on with the business today I want to bring a note that has been handed to me before you. I have been asked as the Minister of Defence what I intend to do as regards rumours that are going around to the effect that certain Deputies of this body from Cork City and County are to be shot if they do not vote against the ratification of the Treaty. I would like everyone to realise that I cannot deal with rumours. The sensible thing for everyone who hears such a rumour is to tell the person or persons who tells him or her to keep his or her mouth shut and not be circulating the rumour further. The tale-bearer is as bad as the tale-maker. If anyone can give me evidence that any particular officer or private of the army has made any such statement I will deal with that officer or man. I can do nothing else. I cannot deal with rumours but let nobody continue to circulate for goodness sake.
MR. P. Ó MÁILLE MR. P. Ó MÁILLE
MR. P. Ó MÁILLE: Arising out of—
THE SPEAKER THE SPEAKER
THE SPEAKER: The Minister for Defence has answered the question.
MR. P. Ó MÁILLE MR. P. Ó MÁILLE
MR. P. Ó MÁILLE: But I have a matter to bring before the Dáil.
THE SPEAKER THE SPEAKER
THE SPEAKER: The Minister of Defence has answered a question and satisfactorily. We cannot take up a discussion.
MR. SEÁN MILROY MR. SEÁN MILROY
MR. SEÁN MILROY: I do not think he has yet told us whether or not he is going to deal with the person or persons responsible for the warning issued to the Cork members.
MR. CATHAL BRUGHA MR. CATHAL BRUGHA
MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: I will certainly deal with them.
MR. D. CEANNT MR. D. CEANNT
[182] MR. D. CEANNT: I think that is satisfactorily settled.
MR. P. O'KEEFFE MR. P. O'KEEFFE
MR. P. O'KEEFFE: I want you, Mr. Speaker, to have that document read to the House. I would also ask if the official shorthand writer has it written down.
MR. CATHAL BRUGHA MR. CATHAL BRUGHA
MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: I will read that document now.
MR. P. O'KEEFFE MR. P. O'KEEFFE
MR. P. O'KEEFFE: Was that document read to the House? Has the Clerk of the House a shorthand note of it?
MR. CATHAL BRUGHA MR. CATHAL BRUGHA
MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: Mr. Speaker, I did not state that the document was read to the House. The answer I have given now was in connection with a question put to me with regard to rumours. This particular document was handed to me now by a member. It was not my duty to the House but I will read it to the House now and it will be just as well to do it and I am going to deal with the man responsible for it whether he agrees with my views or not. As long as I am Minister of Defence there is going to be discipline in the army (Hear, hear). This is the document handed to the senior Deputy for Cork City:
“To all T.D.'s in the Cork No. 1 Area:
(1) On December 10th the Staff of the First Southern Division and all Brigade Commandants met and sent forward to G.H.Q. a unanimous demand for the rejection of the Treaty proposals.
(2) You are reminded it is your duty to support this demand.
(3) To act otherwise would be treason to the Republic to which we have all sworn allegiance.”
Now I have given you my assurance that I am going to deal with the persons responsible for sending out that.
MR. P. Ó MÁILLE MR. P. Ó MÁILLE
MR. P. Ó MÁILLE: I have a question to ask the Minister of Defence. Can I put it?
MR. J.J. WALSH MR. J.J. WALSH
MR. J.J. WALSH: As the member who handed in the document I must confess I am perfectly satisfied the Minister of Defence is quite prepared to do his duty. I have no doubt about that and no one else should have nor do I think that the men who collaborated [sic] the document really intended to do any harm.
THE SPEAKER THE SPEAKER
THE SPEAKER: I fear you are going into a discussion now; we must keep in order.
MR. J.J. WALSH MR. J.J. WALSH
MR. J.J. WALSH: I am perfectly satisfied, to cut it short, that the Minister of Defence is going to do his duty in all respects.
MR. SEÁN MOYLAN MR. SEÁN MOYLAN
MR. SEÁN MOYLAN: Will we have any guarantee that the army will be protected from people spreading rumours about it?
THE SPEAKER THE SPEAKER
THE SPEAKER: Now, we must proceed to business. Are these eight documents that are ready private and confidential?
MR. M. HAYES MR. M. HAYES
MR. M. HAYES: Yes.
THE SPEAKER THE SPEAKER
THE SPEAKER: Therefore it is necessary those who receive the documents shall hand them back. I should like to know what is the duty of individual members in another respect which has not been mentioned at all, that is to say with regard to making copies or extracts from these documents.
MR. M. HAYES MR. M. HAYES
MR. M. HAYES: From what I understand the members have not a right to make extracts or copies of the documents or even to bring them outside this room.
PROFESSOR STOCKLEY PROFESSOR STOCKLEY
PROFESSOR STOCKLEY: There is a further matter. The members should undertake not to speak about them.
THE SPEAKER THE SPEAKER
THE SPEAKER: That is covered by the statement that the documents are absolutely private.
MR. ARTHUR GRIFFITH MR. ARTHUR GRIFFITH
MR. ARTHUR GRIFFITH: There was a mutual agreement that there would be no disclosure or publication of the documents connected with the delegation unless both sides agreed to publication and therefore if we published any documents outside here we could be charged with a breach of faith.
MR. SEÁN ETCHINGHAM MR. SEÁN ETCHINGHAM
MR. SEÁN ETCHINGHAM: It will take some hours to read over the documents; will any other business be proceeded with while we are considering them?
THE SPEAKER THE SPEAKER
THE SPEAKER: We will see what the [183] course of the proceedings will be when the arrangements are made for giving out the documents. Will the member for the University state the course the members are to take with regard to receiving the documents?
MR. M. HAYES MR. M. HAYES
MR. M. HAYES: Each member will go around the table where there are two clerks and they will get the documents.
THE SPEAKER THE SPEAKER
THE SPEAKER: They had better go in some particular order.
The documents having been duly distributed—
MR. GEORGE GAVAN DUFFY MR. GEORGE GAVAN DUFFY
MR. GEORGE GAVAN DUFFY: There is nothing in the documents before us which shows clearly what are the differences—the substantial differences— between the document which was before the Cabinet at its last meeting before the Treaty was signed and the Treaty that was eventually signed. May I suggest it would be useful if the four or five points of difference between the document as shown to the Cabinet and the document as signed were stated before the House so that you will have a clear idea of the differences between the two? I have here the document showing the sequence of events and I could in three or four minutes tell you, if you think it would be useful, what in fact are the differences between the documents before the Cabinet two or three days before the signing of the Treaty and the Treaty as eventually signed. You have all now before you copies of the document before the Cabinet and the Treaty. When you have these two typed out it is not easy to see the differences at once. I think I can make it all plain in a few words. It is necessary the House should know how the matter stands.
MR. MICHL. COLLINS MR. MICHL. COLLINS
MR. MICHL. COLLINS: Mr. Speaker, there is a vital document missing. There should be, in full, the exact document presented to the Cabinet.
MR. KEVIN O'HIGGINS MR. KEVIN O'HIGGINS
MR. KEVIN O'HIGGINS: It is here.
MR. M. COLLINS MR. M. COLLINS
MR. M. COLLINS: Oh! is it?
MR. G. GAVAN DUFFY MR. G. GAVAN DUFFY
MR. G. GAVAN DUFFY: One of the documents before you is the document to which the Secretary's notes refers— “S.F.C.29”, it is headed. The first alteration between what I may call the document before the Cabinet and the Treaty is in clause 3. It provides for the representative of the British Crown. As before the Cabinet that clause stood: “The representative of the Crown in Ireland shall be a Governor-General appointed in like manner as in Canada”. The words Governor-General are left out in the Treaty. It is open to you to give that gentlemen whatever name you think proper. The next deals with the Oath. The main difference between the Oath as before the Cabinet and the Oath as in the Treaty is this. As before the Cabinet, the Oath read, “I ... do solemnly swear to bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State and the community of nations known as the British Empire, and to the King as head of the State and of the Empire”, instead of the form in which you have it in the Treaty. The next thing is in clause 5 where there is a small alteration. The Government had proposed that the Irish Free State shall contribute towards the British public debt and that was altered to the less objectionable phrase, “shall assume liability”. In the following clause, clause 6, there is a slight improvement as to defences and ten years was reduced to five. The word “exclusively” which was objected to was cut out. A substantial alteration was made in clause 9 which does not exist in the Treaty at all. In the document before the Cabinet it provided that we could not impose any custom duties on the English goods or vice versa. We have to thank Mr. Barton for the fact that that was not included in the Treaty. In the following clause where you now have. “The ports of Great Britain and the Irish Free State shall be freely open to the ships of the other country on payment of the customary port and other dues”, that clause was completely recast. As before the Cabinet it read, “Neither Great Britian nor the Irish Free State shall impose restrictions for protective purposes upon the flow of transport, trade and commerce between Great Britain and Ireland”. That has been narrowed down so and the ports of each country shall be freely open to the other. Then we come to Ulster. In clause 11 which in the Treaty begins. “Until the expiration of one month from the passing of the Act of Parliament for the ratification of this instrument, the powers of the Parliament and the Government of the [184] Irish Free State, etc.,”. That clause as presented to the Cabinet was not one month but twelve months. There was a subsequent clause arranging for the possibility of the exercise of the Ulster veto for six months but the main alteration is this: as finally signed, instead of our not knowing for twelve months what the people of Belfast intended to do, they are cut down to one month from the ratification. The same applies to the following clauses. But the most important alteration of all is that in regard to what the English call safeguards for Ulster. In document presented to the Cabinet, instead of having a list of possible safeguards which Ulster cannot get unless we agree to them and which are mentioned as headings, you have in the document presented to the Cabinet detailed clauses setting out in full every safeguard that the English proposed and setting them out under the edicts of the British government as being what they consider we could reasonably give away to Ulster. You have a long clause about patronage, clause 15 I think, in the Treaty. It is only a list of headings. In the document before the Cabinet you had, “No export duties shall without the consent of the Parliament of Northern Ireland be imposed on any manufactures of Northern Ireland”. Then you have this, “That the organization and control of any part of the local military defence force which is raised or stationed in Northern Ireland shall be in the hands”—I beg your pardon, that is not it. You have a very pernicious clause to this effect, “It shall be lawful for the Government of Northern Ireland to raise and maintain in addition to and for the purpose of the support of any police force raised by them a local militia, so however that the establishments thereof shall not exceed in size such proportion of the establishments of any local military defence force maintained by the Government of the Irish Free State as that which the population of Northern Ireland bears to the population of the rest of Ireland, and no part of any local defence force raised by the Government of the Irish Free State shall be stationed in Northern Ireland without the consent of the Government of Northern Ireland”. In other words you are putting these people into a military position which would be surely dangerous to us, and putting them there with the edict of the British Government saying, “this is the right thing to do and this is the thing we are standing for”. Now all that is changed into a suggestion of some military defence force which might be a safeguard. I am not sure whether I have already mentioned that they were to have a most extraordinary power over customs in Belfast, proposed by the British government, and to be set up by the British government as a condition of settlement if these terms were accepted by Ulster. They were to be given the right to collect all the customs coming into Belfast and to keep them until the end of the year. Then, if and when they agreed to do so, a balance was to be handed over to us. They might be good enough to hand it over. They require something like three millions over and above what they collect to run their district and this proposal of the British Government was giving them thirteen or fourteen millions. I mention these things because perhaps many of you know I am not enthusiastic about this Treaty although I am going to support it. But I do want the position to be put fairly before everybody. It is necessary that you should know that some of the most substantial concessions that were obtained were obtained at the last moment in the evening and afternoon of the day on which the Treaty was signed. These were matters on which these people refused to give in until the last moment which may prove that they were bluffing all along; but that is a matter of opinion. At all events some of these most substantial concessions came along at the last moment.
MR. AUSTIN STACK MR. AUSTIN STACK
MR. AUSTIN STACK: I am sure you will convey to the House that the draft document, or no part of it, was approved by the Cabinet at the meeting.
MR. G. GAVAN DUFFY MR. G. GAVAN DUFFY
MR. G. GAVAN DUFFY: I do not for a moment mean to suggest the Cabinet accepted the English proposals. Far from it. In fact if you like to look at the notes you will see we all rejected them. I am not suggesting that the Cabinet accepted. The terms eventually signed were undoubtedly very much better in certain respects than the terms before the Cabinet.
MR. P.J. HOGAN MR. P.J. HOGAN
MR. P.J. HOGAN: I think the Dáil is entitled to know how far the Cabinet agreed with document 3.&Mac182;
1. It would appear that Deputy Hogan was referring to the document printed in Appendix 10.
PRESIDENT DE VALERA PRESIDENT DE VALERA
[185] PRESIDENT DE VALERA: I suppose as chairman of the Cabinet it is my business to answer that question. I have here my own copy with my own markings on it. I ought first of all to say—and I know the mind of the Cabinet—that there was no chance whatever of the acceptance of this document. I had it before me and went through it as you would go through the text of any matter and pointed out the objectionable things as they went along and made suggestions as to the things that might possibly be accepted. I have number three marked showing that the representative of the Crown was one of the vital things that should be got rid of; otherwise it could not be accepted. Then again I have “Head of the State” marked. I pointed out the external association for which we are aiming would be inconsistent with having the King as the head of the state. We were willing to regard him as head of the association. We went through it pointing out these things and we all agreed these were impossible; so really there was no agreement of any kind except the document was unacceptable and we mentioned the particular points such as with regard to the Oath. It was a destructive criticism of the document. I pointed out the sort of oath you could and the oath you could not take. I pointed out I for one would be quite willing to swear some sort of an oath like this. It was simply an immediate—an impromptu— statement of the type of oath I would be willing to swear. I did it in order to point out the difference between the oath and the Oath you would have to swear to the King. We did not want the King as the monarch of Ireland; that was the main thing. Mr. Gavan Duffy was taking down my impromptu statement. I said the Oath as it stood would not do because it was dangerous and there was another interpretation to it. Now a definite answer to the question is that this document was, without discussion, rejected at the Cabinet meeting. I pointed out to the Cabinet the objectionable points. In an impromptu manner I stated the type of oath I was willing to take. There was destructive criticism of the document.
MR. P.J. HOGAN MR. P.J. HOGAN
MR. P.J. HOGAN: This Cabinet meeting was called to consider the document dated December 2nd. That was the document which the plenipotentiaries brought back and the Cabinet was to meet the plenipotentiaries and advise them on the document. Now this document professes to be what the plenipotentiaries thought was the advice and instruction which they got from the Cabinet on that occasion. That may be wrong but in order to make it more definite—
PRESIDENT DE VALERA PRESIDENT DE VALERA
PRESIDENT DE VALERA: Will you please definitely state the number and section of the document; we are perhaps talking about different documents.
MR. P.J. HOGAN MR. P.J. HOGAN
MR. P.J. HOGAN: I am dealing with the set of documents dated December 4th. It is headed, “Amendments by the Irish Representatives to the Proposed Articles of Agreement, December 4th.”
PRESIDENT DE VALERA PRESIDENT DE VALERA
PRESIDENT DE VALERA: Yes.
MR. P.J. HOGAN MR. P.J. HOGAN
MR. P.J. HOGAN: That document professes to be at least the plenipotentiaries' idea of the advice which they got from the Cabinet at the meeting specially called to give them advice on a most critical occasion. It professes to be that at least. We are entitled to know here how far the Cabinet say that document is an accurate summary of the advice given to them, how far the President is prepared to stand by it and how far the Minister of Home Affairs and the Minister of Defence are prepared to stand by it. Take paragraph 5, the Oath, “I do swear to bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of Ireland and to the Treaty of Association of Ireland with the British Commonwealth of Nations and to recognise the King of Great Britain as Head of the Associated States”. That was written down by one of the plenipotentiaries and is, I assume, what the plenipotentiaries agreed to as the nature of the oath that the Cabinet instructed them they were prepared to accept. That certainly is the plenipotentiaries' idea of it and President de Valera has very fairly stated that he verbally, across the table, made that suggestion himself and President de Valera is borne out by the Secretary's notes of the meeting.
MR. ARTHUR GRIFFITH: Hear, hear.
MR. P.J. HOGAN: To say it was a mere verbal suggestion carries us nowhere. The whole transactions were verbal. It was a verbal suggestion made at a Cabinet meeting held for the purpose of hearing suggestions made.
[186] MR. ARTHUR GRIFFITH: Hear, hear.
MR. P.J. HOGAN: Did the Minister of Defence or the Minister of Home Affairs hear the suggestion? Did they object to it? Are they prepared to stand by it? It should be cleared up now (applause).
PRESIDENT DE VALERA: Will you please remember, to start with, that at the back of our minds in the Cabinet was that any documents that would be submitted to us we would go line by line through them and change them before we would agree with them. Now really a treaty is not a thing you would take down across a table.
MR. P.J. HOGAN MR. P.J. HOGAN
MR. P.J. HOGAN: On a point of order we can discuss afterwards the question of whether the plenipotentiaries were right in signing or not signing it before they came back—
THE SPEAKER THE SPEAKER
THE SPEAKER: Let the President finish his statement.
PRESIDENT DE VALERA PRESIDENT DE VALERA
PRESIDENT DE VALERA: I am speaking now so that you may understand the circumstances of the Cabinet meeting. First of all I got a document from Mr. Griffith which I said I will never sign. Mr. Griffith knew that. Therefore the document came before us at the Cabinet purely from the point of view of destructive criticism. But, as my mind is not the destructive but rather of the other type, I wanted to give an indication to the plenipotentiaries of the sort of thing you could do. The thing you could not do was to swear allegiance to the King as the monarch of Ireland; but you could promise to be faithful to your word and to the Treaty. I paraphrased the oath in the form that would be consistent with our position. I did so and I was not aware it was being taken down until I saw Mr. Gavan Duffy in the middle of it and I was not taking any care of my words. I did say something like this, “I do swear to bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of Ireland”— and so I would have said if I had got this before me—“and be faithful to the treaty of association of Ireland with the commonwealth of nations”. If we signed the Treaty we meant to be faithful and I would be faithful to it. I objected to the association of states the first time I saw it. There are two ways of looking at it. You can look at it as a collective or distributive noun. It is ambiguous. I would not object to the King as chairman or head of the association. As a matter of fact, to show you what I had in mind, I started trying to get some sort of oath. Here is the oath I refer to, “I, so and so, swear to obey the Constitution of Ireland and to keep faith with His Britannic Majesty, so and so, in respect of the treaty associating Ireland with the states of the British Commonwealth”. I for one would be quite ready to swear that; if I thought it was right to enter the association I would be quite ready to swear it. I do hope you understand “S.F.C.29”. That was the document before the Cabinet. The plenipotentiaries went back to London and, as a result of the destructive criticism and perhaps some of the verbal suggestions I made across the table, they tried to produce some document which I never saw. The Treaty was signed before I ever saw that document. Now you ask me to what extent is that a faithful representation of what transpired. I would have objected to that document as I would to the other one. The Oath itself—I would not take it in that form. I would have amended it. As regards 1, 2 and 3, that I stand for them ought to be obvious from the document I put down before you already. About the other parts of it, these were only suggested, where other parts would be objected to. I do not know because I had never seen the document. I knew there were other articles which neither the Minister of Home Affairs not the Minister of Defence would ever agree to. As I have rejected it on other grounds the document had no significance except to get the negotiations farther.
MR. MICHL. COLLINS MR. MICHL. COLLINS
MR. MICHL. COLLINS: One point is this, the delegation came over from London for a very definite, certain Cabinet meeting. We spent the whole day of Saturday at that meeting. I think we had to go back and to get the boat in the evening. If that is to be considered at this stage a casual thing, with the oath in paragraph five read out three times by the President—he gave it out three times—it is strange. Mr. Barton took the oath down twice and Mr. Duffy once. Then we had to go back and make up our minds. We had to put a document in writing and we could not alter it afterwards. We put in a document as being the united opinion of the delegation and as being what happened, as [187] far as we could put into words, what happened at the Cabinet meeting. We have to stand by it now the same as any other document. We could perhaps say that did not represent now the oath we were prepared to take then but it is there on paper. If we were prepared to take it then we have to say we were prepared to take it then.
MR. P.J. HOGAN MR. P.J. HOGAN
MR. P.J. HOGAN: This is too important to allow of any ambiguity. The President says he is not prepared to take the Oath.
PRESIDENT DE VALERA PRESIDENT DE VALERA
PRESIDENT DE VALERA: Because of the word—
MR. P.J. HOGAN MR. P.J. HOGAN
MR. P.J. HOGAN: I do not want to make any point on words or make any debating point. I do not think he denies this oath is the oath he stated that day to the plenipotentiaries as his idea of the oath that should be taken. I would not make that point at all. It is important in its other implications. If he does not deny that was the oath he suggested across the table, I think it is quite clear—if that was the oath and the Ministers of Home Affairs and Defence were present and heard it, I want to know did they ever repudiate it?
PRESIDENT DE VALERA PRESIDENT DE VALERA
PRESIDENT DE VALERA: I want to try and get the Dáil to try and understand the circumstances. Do not on little points try to make difficulties. I want clearly to have it understood. They were responsible for initiation at the other side. The Cabinet meeting was called for one purpose, whether we would accept the Crown or not, and we said we would not. This document was before us for destructive criticism mainly. The plenipotentiaries were the people to make proposals not the Cabinet. The Cabinet was the final power before it came to the Dáil to criticise the proposals, and say whether they would accept them or not. This document was unacceptable on hundreds of grounds. One was sufficient for us. We were ready for external association, ready to recognise the King as head of a group of states and we wished to embody that in an oath. Neither myself nor the Ministers of Home Affairs and Defence ever saw that in writing and we could not say definitely. It was an attempt to show how the head of the state came in and how objectionable it was, “I do solemnly swear to bear etc.” that would be alright, but as regards “community of nations” I never would swear to be faithful to that. That did not represent my view—
MR. M. COLLINS MR. M. COLLINS
MR. M. COLLINS: You are reading out the wrong oath.
PRESIDENT DE VALERA PRESIDENT DE VALERA
PRESIDENT DE VALERA: I am sorry. “I do swear to recognise the King of Great Britain as head of the associated states”. That was the way I expressed it verbally meaning the association of states. Well now I am anxious merely that every member here should realise what happened at the Cabinet meeting. The delegation went back. I never knew—I never saw the document until it came here. The Treaty was signed before I saw the document. There was a definite assurance at the Cabinet meeting there would be no question of signing the Treaty unless the Dáil got it back. Therefore I did not give, nor did the Cabinet give, any instructions to the delegation as to any final document which they were to put in.
MR. CATHAL BRUGHA MR. CATHAL BRUGHA
MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: I would ask you to read the documents very carefully. I have not the time to read them all. I read most of the documents but the one of December 4th I did not see at all. I have not the time to read all the documents you have got in your hands because I have a lot of business here which is very urgent dealing with my own department and with which I have to deal. It is more urgent so far as I am concerned than these documents. If there is anything in any of these documents from which it would seem that the Cabinet or any individual member let down the Republic, now is the time to take notice of it and ask questions. When it comes to the proper time I will explain my position pretty clearly and I will prove to everyone that the Republic was never let down by those who remained behind in any case—by the three here anyway or even those who remained behind. I defy anyone to prove to the contrary. If they think they can when I have spoken let them prove it. With regard to the oath, I never agreed to take any oath and when the President made this suggestion of his own I said, “Nothing doing; there is going to be no unanimity on such an oath as that” (applause).
MR. KEVIN O'HIGGINS MR. KEVIN O'HIGGINS
[188] MR. KEVIN O'HIGGINS: I too will be anxious to make it clear to the House the genesis of the document of December 4th and circumstances of the Cabinet meeting of that Saturday. You will remember that Mr. Lloyd George, as early as the week before, had written to Sir James Craig stating that “either the negotiations will have broken down by Tuesday next or I will have further proposals to make to your Government”. The plenipotentiaries came home with the same final proposals from the Government and they met the Cabinet on Saturday. I do say these amendments put in by the plenipotentiaries after they went back were put in as representing the views of the Cabinet of the Dáil and that they do represent them and that the plenipotentiaries were certainly entitled to consider they represented them. The President stated a Governor-General was an insuperable obstacle as a representative of the Crown in Ireland. I remember a Cabinet meeting in October in Fitzwilliam Square. The plenipotentiaries were not present. I was present, the Ministers for Local Government, Home Affairs and Defence were present and I remember the President stating there that under the external association idea, his own scheme, there would almost certainly be a representative of the British Crown in Ireland.
PRESIDENT DE VALERA PRESIDENT DE VALERA
PRESIDENT DE VALERA: I can contradict that at once.
CATHAL BRUGHA CATHAL BRUGHA
CATHAL BRUGHA: It is absolutely false.
MR. KEVIN O'HIGGINS MR. KEVIN O'HIGGINS
MR. KEVIN O'HIGGINS: I said I considered it objectionable. No matter who this person might be he would be here with his little court and coterie and all the West-British element would rally around the court and it will have this effect: it may put on your higher social circles a distinctly English standard, and it may further be the centre of intrigue against the State, and a constant pull towards England (Hear, hear). The President said “Yes”; he saw all these objections and realised that, and no one would feel it more bitterly than he would if our higher social circles would take civilization and culture for all time from England. “But”, he added, “what can you do?” The Minister for Defence made a statement and I for one was very surprised. He said he would not take the oath, or any oath, that there was “nothing doing”. There was everything doing. He did stick to one point and that was the point of contribution to the Civil List. It savoured of tribute absolutely none on the question of the oath. I would say here I believe that any of these three men opposite would have taken an oath something as follows: “I do solemnly swear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State, to the Treaty of Association and to recognise the King of Gt. Britain of the Associated States” [sic].
PRESIDENT DE VALERA PRESIDENT DE VALERA
PRESIDENT DE VALERA: I for one—
CATHAL BRUGHA CATHAL BRUGHA
CATHAL BRUGHA: For goodness' sake let us have this thing settled. This is a very vital matter. If a man tells me black is white—if a man has such mentality I cannot persuade him to the contrary. It would be impossible. If a man says black is white, very well, let him think so. Let this gentleman show any document or any writing, secretary's notes or otherwise, to the effect that I ever consented to take any oath—
MR. KEVIN O'HIGGINS MR. KEVIN O'HIGGINS
MR. KEVIN O'HIGGINS: Yes, sir.
MR. J.J. WALSH MR. J.J. WALSH
MR. J.J. WALSH: A question has been asked.
MR. KEVIN O'HIGGINS MR. KEVIN O'HIGGINS
MR. KEVIN O'HIGGINS: Take the secretary's notes, page three. The President took his stand on the last Irish proposals which meant external association with the Crown. We will read the President's view— “Meeting of Cabinet... In the course of a lengthy discussion of the Treaty the President gave it as his opinion that it could not be accepted in its then form. He personally could not subscribe to the Oath of Allegiance nor could he sign any document which would give N.E. Ulster power to vote itself out of the Irish State... “The Minister for Defence is in perfect agreement with the President, the only matter upon which he could disagree would be the question of recognising the King of England as head of the Associated States” (laughter). My impression—
MR. CATHAL BRUGHA MR. CATHAL BRUGHA
MR. CATHAL BRUGHA: We are finished with your impressions so far as I am concerned.
MR. M. COLLINS MR. M. COLLINS
MR. M. COLLINS: On point of order— I should like to ask the President whether [189] he did not ask the Minister for Defence would he take the oath, whether the Minister for Defence said, “No”, and the President said, “Surely Cathal you can't object to taking an oath if you agree to association.”
MR. C. BRUGHA MR. C. BRUGHA
MR. C. BRUGHA: I will explain this. I said in answer to that “Well, you may as well swear”. Include the whole document, or what we agreed in the document, and that was not very much.
MR. K. O'HIGGINS MR. K. O'HIGGINS
MR. K. O'HIGGINS: I withdraw my remarks in so far as they regard the Minister of Defence to say that they apply in full force to the Minister for Home Affairs.
MADAME MARKIEVICZ MADAME MARKIEVICZ
MADAME MARKIEVICZ: Let me give a conversation I had with the President. I can't give you the date; it was some time previous to this and the President then deliberately told me what the oath was and he made diagrams on the table to show me what outside association meant.
MR. J.J. WALSH MR. J.J. WALSH
MR. J.J. WALSH: On a point of order, we can't have a conversation. I object to it.
MADAME MARKIEVICZ MADAME MARKIEVICZ
MADAME MARKIEVICZ: I wish to speak.
MR. J.J. WALSH MR. J.J. WALSH
MR. J.J. WALSH: I object to that. We can't have a conversation (Chair, chair).
MR. DE RÓISTE MR. DE RÓISTE
MR. DE RÓISTE: I don't know what all this is about at all. I personally refuse to—
THE SPEAKER THE SPEAKER
THE SPEAKER: Countess Markievicz is in possession.
MADAME MARKIEVICZ MADAME MARKIEVICZ
MADAME MARKIEVICZ: I made that statement because, as one of those people who was asked to stand down from the Cabinet to form a War Cabinet, I think [recte thought] that the question should be put to the President and the President told me a matter of some importance, because if I had at any moment not been certain that the President would have taken that stand. I would have created some trouble outside the Cabinet. That is why I consider, because of my position standing down from the Ministry, that I have a right to state why I remained quiet.
MR. ML. HAYES MR. ML. HAYES
MR. ML. HAYES: I suggest, as chairman of the committee which got these documents together, it was in the interests of some order in our proceedings that we got these documents together. We consulted everybody I think and we satisfied everybody with the documents we have got. If we are going to discuss anything more let it be something which is relevant to the documents and let us not take any account of expressions and of conversations which have no reference to the documents before us. Let us have a question relating to the documents, for my part as a private member who wants information. The recent discussion clears my mind on some points. If it goes on like that with people quoting from the documents before them we get some distance. If we depart from that we get nowhere.
MR. ETCHINGHAM MR. ETCHINGHAM
MR. ETCHINGHAM: I had no time to read the documents. I have only gone through four of them. It is a momentous thing for our country and we must know what is going to happen beyond what the President is going to say to us. We can't risk this thing. I have not a legal mind. Some have a prior knowledge of these documents on which to start a discussion. I want to get through them. I have here a document I am interested in where Lloyd George claimed he was let down and where the Chairman of the Delegation said he did not let him down. I want to go through them and I want time to discuss them.
MR. K. O'HIGGINS MR. K. O'HIGGINS
MR. K. O'HIGGINS: The last speaker said he hadn't a legal mind. This is the first time I saw the documents. I was a member of the committee and I never laid eyes on one of them. I asked a question of President of the Cabinet and of the Ministers and I would ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs to answer my question because I regard the question as most important, and for this reason I say that an attempt has been made here to show that the issue is on one side of the House as against the other side, is a Republic versus Dominion Home Rule, and I want to put the issue straight and know where everyone here stands and not to vote because I think so and so is on one side and so and so is on the other (applause).
MR. STACK MR. STACK
MR. STACK: I would prefer to wait until another violent and false attack is made on me as was made on the Minister of Defence. I have no hesitation in saying [190] that, so far as I was concerned, I was perfectly in agreement with the President in his suggestion that we could frame a form of oath which would be honourable to the nation and preserve our independence and I certainly would be with him in the form of oath which he suggested.
MR. ML. COLLINS MR. ML. COLLINS
MR. ML. COLLINS: May I ask the Minister for Home Affairs whether he agrees with the Cabinet record of the oath as read by President De Valera three times?
MR. STACK MR. STACK
MR. STACK: The oath was never seen by me in writing. I never took it down in writing and it was read out by the President. As read out by him I certainly approved of it and, what is more, I tried to convince the Minister for Defence that he ought to agree in order to give our people going over to London a chance of manoeuvering the British Cabinet; and, what is more, the suggestion made of the President going over was that the British Cabinet should be manoeuvered into a position of suggesting that form of oath.
MR. ML. COLLINS MR. ML. COLLINS
MR. ML. COLLINS: Might I ask whether he agrees with the Cabinet record given by yourself to me in the presence of the Minister for Home Affairs that the words of the oath as given in the Cabinet record, December 3rd, page 3, paragraph B.
MR. STACK MR. STACK
MR. STACK: I have said before that my idea is what the President read out.
THE PRESIDENT THE PRESIDENT
THE PRESIDENT: I did not read it out. I said it.
MR. STACK MR. STACK
MR. STACK: Spoke it or whatever it was; I know very well that he had nothing written about the thing. It is certainly not in accordance with my recollection. What happened was that he said that he would recognise the King of Gt. Britain as head of the association.
MR. BARTON MR. BARTON
MR. BARTON: I was present at this Cabinet meeting and I was one of those who took down the President's words. As a matter of fact the President made two sketches of the oath; Mr. Gavan Duffy says three. I took down two. Unfortunately I have only one with me; but when I got back to London, with the assistance of Mr. Childers I drafted a formal oath from the oaths on the memoranda which I had taken down of the President's; and anything which is in that original draft, which I made with Mr. Childers alone without the collaboration of any other person, must have been in one or other of these statements which I took down from the President's own mouth; and the original which I wrote down and which Mr. Childers had typed had not been seen at that time by anyone, but Mr. Gavan Duffy had agreed with it and it was afterwards altered. I will read to you now the one which we made up from the two. The one which I have down here is this—so far as I remember the President's words were something like these, “The oath will be something like this—”
THE PRESIDENT THE PRESIDENT
THE PRESIDENT: That is just it, “something like that”.
MR. BARTON MR. BARTON
MR. BARTON: “Allegiance to the Constitution of Ireland, association of Ireland with the community of nations”. Now I have got “Com.” I don't know whether that means a Commonwealth of Nations or a Community of Nations. I don't know. “Association of the ‘Com’ of nations and recognition of the head of that ‘Com’ ”. Now the President gave another. My memory of it is that instead of a Community of Nations he said, “the head of that association” and after I got back to London I drafted this oath with Mr. Childers' assistance, “I do solemnly swear to bear true faith and allegiance to the constitution of Ireland and to the Treaty of Association of Ireland with the British Commonwealth of Nations and I recognise King George V as head of that Association”. Mr. Childers and I drafted that oath. Mr. Gavan Duffy came in later. He had been to Mass. We asked him whether he agreed with this and as far as I remember he said he did. We then met later, the other three members of the delegation coming in. There was some discussion then as to whether the oath should read, “Association” or “Associated States”, and it was changed to “Associated States”, but in my opinion the President said “Community of Nations” or “Commonwealth of Nations” or “Association” and nothing else.
MR. ML. COLLINS MR. ML. COLLINS
MR. ML. COLLINS: Did he say, “King George V”?
MR. BARTON MR. BARTON
MR. BARTON: He did not say King George V. I drafted that with Mr. Childers' assistance.
THE PRESIDENT THE PRESIDENT
[191] THE PRESIDENT: I never suggested King George V being in the oath.
MR. ML. COLLINS MR. ML. COLLINS
MR. ML. COLLINS: He suggested the King. I don't know what King George is if he is not the King.
MR. CHILDERS MR. CHILDERS
MR. CHILDERS: I rise to corroborate what Mr. Barton has just said. Exactly what he said has taken place. I have looked over my own records and have a typed copy which I gave the typist to type containing the word “Association” and not “Associated States”. I myself did not attach any importance to the alteration because it never occured to my mind that there could be any real difference between the two phrases owing to the fact that the oath of course must follow the form of the political constitution of the country; and in that connection I would like to point rather an important omission from the secretary's notes bearing somehow on their reliability as a record of what took place, namely that at the end of the discussion on the oath I expressly raised the point myself as to whether scrapping the oath in the British draft meant scrapping of the first four clauses of the British draft, that is to say the clauses setting out Dominion status. The answer was that of course the oath did, all the clauses went and Dominion status was scrapped.
MR. ML. COLLINS MR. ML. COLLINS
MR. ML. COLLINS: On a point of order there was a question asked about the oath not about a constitutional point. I am not a constitutional lawyer. Everyone knew that before I went away. Is my point of order conceded?
MR. CHILDERS MR. CHILDERS
MR. CHILDERS: I don't want to carry it any further.
THE SPEAKER THE SPEAKER
THE SPEAKER: I couldn't limit the speakers in that way. They may make their points to bring them into touch with what their argument is. I can't rule out every point simply because it does not appear for the moment to be that under discussion.
MR. CHILDERS MR. CHILDERS
MR. CHILDERS: You will see in the amendment of the Irish representatives to the proposed articles of agreement. You will see at the end of that oath occurs the word “Associated States”. That is not the word Mr. Barton has said we brought away from the Cabinet meeting. The word was “Association”. They must mean the same thing because obviously clause 1 of the amendment does away with the King of Ireland altogether. Consequently they are not giving an oath to him as King of Ireland.
MR. GAVAN DUFFY MR. GAVAN DUFFY
MR. GAVAN DUFFY: I rise to move the closure of the debate and this particular matter for this reason that it is now perfectly clear that the only substantial difference between the people there present is as to whether the President used the words “Associated States” or “Association”. That may be a vital matter. As far as I can make out the only reason of the difference is that some people may interpret “Associated States” distinctively. Now, is it worth while wasting the time of the House as to whether the President used the particular words “Associated States” or “Association” taken down by Mr. Barton?
MR. MACCABE MR. MACCABE
MR. MACCABE: May I make my statement?
THE SPEAKER THE SPEAKER
THE SPEAKER: I have not asked you to speak yet. It is almost 1.30 now. This portion of the Order of Procedure will end at 1.45, and with regard to the Order of Procedure what I would like to know would be what conclusion—in what form is a conclusion—to be reached arising out of the discussion that has been carried on today. It seems to me that the discussion, which is as I put it plainly to you an impeachment, is on the question of responsibility for various terms in the Treaty, to ascertain who is responsible for the various terms in the Treaty. When that is ascertained what is going to happen, if it can be ascertained? I doubt if it can be ascertained. It would take a very careful court of law to ascertain where the personal responsibility is in all these things and how far one person is responsible and how far another. Assuming that is ascertained I should like to know what is going to come from it.
THE PRESIDENT THE PRESIDENT
THE PRESIDENT: I should like—
MR. M. COLLINS MR. M. COLLINS
MR. M. COLLINS: May I say that a most important position has been reached.
THE SPEAKER THE SPEAKER
THE SPEAKER: Part of my office here is to direct the minds of the members to a practical conclusion. We are reaching no nearer that and, if we are going to reach a practical conclusion by the consideration of documents and the other questions, I think it should be embodied by one or [192] other positive motions laid before us. It would be better for us completely to drop this part and come to the question of ratification or non-ratification.
THE PRESIDENT THE PRESIDENT
THE PRESIDENT: I will make the whole thing clear in a few words. From the time I went into the negotiations I went out to make peace by negotiation if I could—an honourable peace. I used the word in the terms of reference to the delegation, to find out the way in which Irish national aspirations could be reconciled with association with the British Commonwealth. You all knew that that was the purpose for which the delegation went across. Now I set myself the constructive task of trying to work out such an association in detail. We gave to the plenipotentiaries a rough draft of a treaty that was the basis of their proposals, the basis of their standpoint, and the British put forward proposals which from the first day were Dominion Home Rule proposals. All their line of action was dictated from that point of view, whereas, from our point of view we were trying to get the idea of external association with the British Commonwealth. That was the main objective. To get an association of that kind you had to give up no Republic because there is not a single line in these proposals that I have given you which is not consistent with a Republic. There is not a line of that Treaty that France might not make if it wanted to with Britain or that Spain might not make with Britain and therefore I say that from my standpoint I keep an absolute Republic as an existing fact in mind, a Republic ready to make an association outside. I was proposing, therefore, that the Republic in association [sic]. There are objections to a Republic in association, I don't deny; there are objections such as the United States would have to entering into a League of Nations, but if we were to get anywhere by negotiations we are to have some objective like that. One end of the Cabinet wanted an absolutely isolated Republic. My task was to try to get by negotiations something which would satisfy Britain, something which would satisfy what I may call the left wing of the Cabinet and something which would satisfy the right wing. Everyone of these documents will be found to be consistent with that statement and any assumption that this question is not a question between a Republic and Dominion Home Rule, you can judge that for yourselves. The issue you will find is that document of mine is a Republican document, a document of association. That was my position. The left wing of the Cabinet was for an isolated Republic for the most part but I pulled them over a bit. I pulled them along. I say in fact what happened, while I was pulling along that wing, the other wing got away from me, not that they were anxious to be pulled but pulled by threats of force and the danger of war. My statement might be accepted as inferring that they were anxious to be pulled. We know that every one of these wanted a Republic as much as I wanted it and everyone here wanted it and therefore what happened was that over there a threat of immediate force upon our people was made. I believe that that document was signed under duress and, though I have a moral feeling that any agreement entered into ought to be faithfully carried out, I have no hesitation in saying that I would not regard it as binding on the Irish nation. If it was to be put into force for one instant to weaken [sic] against ratification because it is giving away a moral basis.
MR. C. BRUGHA MR. C. BRUGHA
MR. C. BRUGHA: Will you give me two or three minutes? I will ask the indulgence of this body to listen to what I have to say without interruption. I can forgive the five men who have landed us into the present position because I realised before ever they went there— mind you I was against their ever going to England, I said this conference should be held in a neutral country—I realised before ever they went there the terrible influence that would be brought to bear upon them. We have got the proof of that.
MR. GAVAN DUFFY MR. GAVAN DUFFY
MR. GAVAN DUFFY: Where is it?
MR. ML. COLLINS MR. ML. COLLINS
MR. ML. COLLINS: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman please, I must insist on this. It is for us to explain our mental condition in London, not for somebody else (Hear, hear).
MR. C. BRUGHA MR. C. BRUGHA
MR. C. BRUGHA: Will you kindly listen to me without interruption and anybody who has any explanation to make can do so at the proper time. I have heard Mr. Lloyd George referred to as the “wizard from Wales” without properly understanding what was intended by it, but I have got a proof of his wizardry in [193] what has happened within the last fortnight. We have the chairman of the delegation—an honest man as I know him to be—coming along the day before yesterday and telling us that this thing was freedom. I say that Mr. Lloyd George, who is the wizard, has cast a spell over the chairman of our delegation and has put him into such a stupor that he does not know the difference between this document and freedom. It is obvious—no offence intended. We heard the Minister for Finance confess yesterday that he was in a fog—
MR. ML. COLLINS MR. ML. COLLINS
MR. ML. COLLINS: That is not so.
MR. BRUGHA MR. BRUGHA
MR. BRUGHA: Well if our friends who are taking down notes refer to them and, if they have taken down all, the Minister of Finance yesterday confessed that he was in a fog. With regard to the third member of this delegation he has remained silent up to the present. He has not attempted to justify his action up to the present and therefore I will extend to him the charity of silence. With regard to the other two members, you have already seen Mr. Barton's notes and you know the intimidation which was resorted to to get his signature. You will get a statement from Mr. Gavan Duffy at the public session if not at the private session which will show the tactics they resorted to so far as he was concerned. I have said that I quite forgive them because I know the influences that were brought to bear upon them to get their signatures to this document, and I can even respect them, though God knows I realise how weak they be; but there is one thing that I can never forgive—and I find it hard to forgive any man and I certainly will find it hard to respect a man who came into our meetings of the Cabinet and, so far as he thinks from a statement he made yesterday, so far as he thinks, the Cabinet let down or, as he said yesterday, gave away the Republic. The man who listened to that being done had taken an oath of allegiance to the Republic and he did not say a word against it. According to his statement yesterday the Cabinet gave away the Republic. Now the man who had taken an oath of allegiance to the Republic and who listened to that being done and did not protest against it—because he thought it was being done—I say I can well find it hard ever to forgive him and to respect him. In fact I will never respect that man until the fight starts again as I am afraid it has been made inevitable by what has taken place within the last fortnight. Prior to that from the way these people over in England were yielding to us, I was beginning to believe that we might come to an arrangement which would be satisfactory to everyone, to what may be called the most extreme people—and I am supposed to be one of those myself—that we could come to an arrangement without any fighting but I am afraid that this thing which has happened within the last fortnight makes a fight inevitable. However, I will respect this gentleman not that my respect will be of any value to him but I will respect him when the fight starts if he follows the lead that I will give him. Now I have a very clear conception of what the people who are called extreme people want and from the very start of those negotiations I took care that those people would not be let down, and I may tell you if we were not let down there were some suggestions which came along and it seemed to me that they bartered or were sailing close to the wind, anyway that they bordered upon the letting down of the Republic. I gave my opinion and I found that such was not intended. Now this gentleman who has made the statement yesterday that the Cabinet let down the Republic, I want to ask him before I speak again—and I am going to make my position pretty clear in this matter—to come along with his proofs. He has tried to prove, by the way he has made an attempt to-day already, to show that I agreed with this oath or any oath, and when I asked him to submit his proofs he had to withdraw what he said. Now let him prove by any document, any act, or even by the evidence of any friend of his who was present, that the Cabinet ever let down the Republic. The first attempt that was made to let down the Republic was this Treaty and I have said that I forgive him [recte them] knowing the circumstances which were responsible, knowing the influences that were brought to bear upon them, but the man upon whom no such influences were brought to bear I certainly cannot forgive him.
MR. GRIFFITH MR. GRIFFITH
MR. GRIFFITH: There was, I think, an understanding arrived at that we should avoid personalities as much as possible in this place.
MR. BRUGHA MR. BRUGHA
[194] MR. BRUGHA: There were statements made about me.
MR. GRIFFITH MR. GRIFFITH
MR. GRIFFITH: There has been a gross personal attack made here on one man. There has been most offensive statements made about members of this delegation. I say I do not need his forgiveness. I do not ask his forgiveness. I have done nothing that I have not a right to do and I have done nothing which I believe is inconsistent with the honour and interests of my country. I shall not ask or seek any man's forgiveness for the action which I took. An attempt has been made undoubtedly to represent the Cabinet as standing firm and immovable on the rock of the Irish Republic and to show that we were the people who went to London and let them down. Now the documents are before you. Base your judgement, not on what any man says, but on these documents (Hear, hear). That is what I ask you to do. In one document you find the form of oath given by the President. There is the oath. In the minutes of the 25th November, 1921, you will find the following formula was unanimously approved, “That Ireland shall recognise the British Crown for the purposes of the Association as symbol and accepted head of the combination of Associated States.” That was the unanimous minute of the Cabinet recognising the British Crown and further a vote of an annual voluntary sum to the Civil List was unanimously approved. I stand on that document. If anyone wants to make the charge against us, who seek to put us before the country in the position of going away and deliberately giving up what they were standing on are not entitled to do that. I ask you simply to use your own estimate of the documents and don't allow personal statements either from ourselves or the other side.
MR. BRUGHA MR. BRUGHA
MR. BRUGHA: We must settle this thing satisfactorily. Let there be no heat or as little heat in doing it and please God we will all come to the proper conclusion and be friends and put Mr. Lloyd George where he should be (Hear, hear). Now, there is no offence intended in what I am going to say in regard to the Minister of Finance now. Certain things happened, things only to be known later, to let everyone understand how things stand. Now the same gentleman to whom I have already referred when I was speaking a few minutes ago, the same gentleman to whom I referred already when I was speaking this morning, said that this matter regarding the vote of an annual voluntary sum to the Civil List was swallowed by the Minister of Defence. Now, I swallowed it eventually and I will show you how I did swallow it. The Minister of Finance came over one week-end and we had a Cabinet meeting on the Sunday and this suggestion of a voluntary sum to the Civil List, so far as my recollection goes, had been made in a memorandum submitted, if I mistake not, by Mr. Chartres. If I mistake not it was he who submitted it. Well, we discussed the matter, or rather the others present discussed it, and eventually I said, “It is not going to settle the matter; I don't believe we are going to settle it on that”. And so far as I was concerned then I was finished with it. Now, the Minister for Finance misunderstood what I said. I have not the slightest intention of saying he deliberately misunderstood me because I don't believe he would do such a thing. What I say now can be corroborated. I did not agree. I said it would not settle the matter and there was no use discussing it then as far as I was concerned and it ended there. Then at the end of the same week, or the following week, the chairman of the delegation and the Minister for Finance came over and it was stated at the meeting we had then that a document agreeing to this had been handed in that morning or that they thought it would have been handed in that morning. They were not exactly certain. I pointed out that I had not agreed to that and eventually, after a discussion, the President put it to me, “Well, can we have unanimity or can we not? I put it down that it had been agreed to, with one dissenting. This means now that we have not unanimity in the Cabinet and the object all along in these negotiations was to have unanimity, to prevent a split as far as it could be done.” It was under these circumstances I said, “Very well, if it has been handed in I am agreed”, in order to preserve unity to the finish.
MR. M. COLLINS MR. M. COLLINS
MR. M. COLLINS: Mr. Speaker, I have risen a couple of times. One statement was made that I said I was in a fog. That statement is incorrect. What I did say was that I was constantly being befogged by constitutional and legal arguments on cases and points which I did [195] not understand, which I do not now understand. With regard to this £100 payment I would ask the President one question, whether when I came back on the following week he did not agree with me that it was the impression that the Minister of Defence had agreed to this £100.
THE PRESIDENT THE PRESIDENT
THE PRESIDENT: I can answer that both statements are correct. There is no incompatibility whatever between them. The point is, as I explained at a previous meeting, I had tried to get unanimity. My position was association because I did not see by negotiation any other way we could manage. Whenever I made a proposal consistent with this association, of course I had the Minister for Defence who would have nothing but an isolated Republic and he, like a number of others, could not conceive that you could have a Republic in association. In any case I had to pull him along in a case like that and he threw up his hands, but it is not right that he said, “I will take it and get done with the whole thing”.
THE SPEAKER THE SPEAKER
THE SPEAKER: I am not going to stand much more of this and I don't believe the country will stand much more of it. I want, in the name of this Dáil, to tell those people who have come here to vindicate themselves that it is not their vindication we want at all. Let them wait for a month or six months and vindicate themselves. It can be done just as well then as now. Is the question of the vindication of persons? Is that the question that is going to go out to the nation from this Dáil because, if it is, you are going to rend the nation in two inevitably, if it is the vindication of persons. I am not going to be responsible for that. You go on with it, I will walk out. I won't be responsible for it and I will tell the people of Ireland my view about this thing, the vindication of persons. No matter how important that may be, no matter how important their honour is to themselves, no matter how necessary it may be in the future for them to vindicate themselves, this is going to go from here to the nation. It is going to split the nation inevitably and the man who carries it out from here, we ought to tell him here he is going out with the purpose in his mind of splitting the nation. I spoke about it yesterday to try and explain the position. I am going to say one word to explain it. I am an Irish Republican now and I am going to remain one. So are we all. Isn't that so? (applause). Yes, and there are no Dominion Home Rulers here, not one, and there is not going to be one (No), no matter what any person reads out of it. Isn't that unanimous? (applause). Very well then, aren't we wasting our time with a lot of nonsense? Well, if we are going to end this business respect for any man on either side is not going to lead me one inch further in this. I am perfectly certain you have heard enough of this and if you have not heard enough of this adjourn the whole thing for a month and adjourn this for a month.
MR. BRUGHA MR. BRUGHA
MR. BRUGHA: You have started your statement with a question and it must be answered. The question is not the vindication of anybody here. The question is that all of your people, before it goes to the country at all, should understand exactly what has happened and if there is any possibility of misconception arising out of any statement in the document it should be settled here before we go to the country.
THE SPEAKER THE SPEAKER
THE SPEAKER: Let it be settled and let us come to some conclusion.
MR. DE RÓISTE MR. DE RÓISTE
MR. DE RÓISTE: If we are to get back where I naturally agree with the Speaker of the House—we are all Republicans and we shall be Republicans whether we accept or reject this Treaty (Question).
THE PRESIDENT THE PRESIDENT
THE PRESIDENT: I must protest here as President against the Speaker of the House making a speech which is prejudicial to what is a most important question because he tried to make it a question of persons.
THE SPEAKER THE SPEAKER
THE SPEAKER: I leave the Chair then. Before I leave the Chair you will carry out your arrangements you have made already with regard to handing back those documents.
MADAME MARKIEVICZ MADAME MARKIEVICZ
MADAME MARKIEVICZ: Sure, we haven't read them.
MR. SEÁN MACENTEE MR. SEÁN MACENTEE
MR. SEÁN MACENTEE: Before you leave the Chair may I try to say what I think is at the bottom of this discussion (No, no, adjourn).
The meeting then adjourned for luncheon at 2 o'clock.
[196] On resuming after luncheon the Deputy Speaker took the Chair at 4.10 p.m.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER THE DEPUTY SPEAKER
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER: I gather that the Deputies are to express their views freely on the general situation. The Whips have a number of names and I will call them in a certain order and I trust that there will be no interruptions and that when a speaker is on his feet he will be allowed to speak. When any Deputy takes exception to any remarks that may be made surely he can make a short note of it and speak afterwards. We cannot possibly get on if interruptions are to be flung across from one side of the room to the other.
MR. AUSTIN STACK MR. AUSTIN STACK
MR. AUSTIN STACK: Arising out of something that happened yesterday when the Minister of Finance was informed of something that had happened in his office—the information was, I think, conveyed to the House by the Deputy for North Cork—I have here the police report with regard to the happening and I think I ought to get liberty to read it. It is with regard to the raid on the office of the Minister for Finance.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER THE DEPUTY SPEAKER
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER: I say here there is no objection to that being read.
MR. STACK MR. STACK
MR. STACK The following is the report:
“ROBBERY AT DÁIL FINANCE OFFICE.
A Chara, I beg to report having in conjunction with the Deputy Director of Intelligence investigated the above robbery. From examination it is quite apparent that the person or persons who entered the office secured keys by some means or other, as from examination there appears to have been no force resorted to, as the doors and locks are not damaged in any way. So far as the staff reports that no documents were removed but a small portable safe which was in a secret recess in the room, and which, I believe contained ten or eleven hundred pounds is missing. It is suggested that it was taken away in a leather case, which is also missing from the office. It is said that the safe would have fitted in this case. Apparently the intruders were very well informed, as it would be very hard for a stranger going into the office to discover the recess, and as it was opened and manipulated without force being applied it would suggest that the intruders were very well acquainted with the office routine. We interrogated some charwomen and others who have access to the building but without any success. No member of the staff can throw any light on the affair. I am informed that the sum of money removed was in fifty pound notes and the banks have been instructed in the matter with a view to tracing the robbers. Numerous documents were strewn round the floor of the office and the drawers of one desk were forced open as if the intruders were looking for documents or money. We interviewed the contractor who supplied the lock; he states that originally he supplied six keys. So far only five of those keys can be accounted for and we have failed as yet to discover who received the sixth key. This man also states that it would be impossible to pick the lock or open it by any other? [sic] device other than the key made for the lock. The only conclusion we can come to is that the intruders had a key, or else that the office door was left open by one of the staff the previous night. The whole thing is a most mysterious affair, as the staff reports no documents were missing and it is an extraordinary thing that ordinary burglars would resort to entering an office of this description in search of valuables or money. The police are still pursuing investigations. I enclose notes of Deputy Director of Intelligence”.
The notes of the Deputy Director of Intelligence read:
“The Yale lock was not forced. Entrance to office could only have been obtained by duplicate key or door was not locked when staff were leaving yesterday evening. The walls seemed to have been sounded as the paper in some places was torn off.
One open press was searched and the contents strewn about. The staff informed us that so far they have not discovered if any papers or correspondence is missing. The small safe which was kept in the recess was [197] possibly taken away in a leather bag belonging to one of the staff. The drawers of the Cabinet desk were forced open and contents scattered. But O'Connor informed us that six keys are accounted for which are in the hands of the staff. We interviewed all the staff and they can throw no light on the matter.”
That is the information that was asked for by the Deputy from North Cork last evening and now when it came to my hands I thought it better to give it.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER THE DEPUTY SPEAKER
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER: If any Deputy for North Cork or Minister for Finance wishes to speak they can do so.
MR. ML. COLLINS MR. ML. COLLINS
MR. ML. COLLINS: The reports agree exactly with the views of the man in charge of the office, Mr. George McGrath, except I think they have got information with respect to the sixth key. Just now a report will be coming along about that.
MR. P. Ó MÁILLE MR. P. Ó MÁILLE
MR. P. Ó MÁILLE: Now my friends, as there are a number here who cannot speak Irish, I will try and repeat what I have said. I am glad that those papers were submitted to us today because in my humble opinion, and the common ordinary man is entitled to his opinion, your attitude and your actions here today will be judged by the man in the street. It is the man in the street who will pass judgment on you and not the logicians who are twisting words. In my humble opinion this document of President de Valera's is a far greater enemy of Republicanism in Ireland than the Treaty itself, because this document tries, as it says in the beginning, “to bring to an end the long and ruinous conflict between Gt. Britain and Ireland by a sure and lasting peace honourable to both nations.” This document is trying to tie every man, woman and child in Ireland and to take them away from the Republican ideal. If the Treaty is passed tomorrow there will be a large minority in the country against it and that party will be the nucleus of a Republican Party. In this document it is proposed under clauses 5 and 7 to form a treaty with England, an offensive and defensive treaty, and if this country is to be invaded, say by the United States, we according to this document of President de Valera's are placing ourselves in the unfortunate position that Belgium was placed in during the late war. Now my friends, there is a great deal of talk of conscience in this. Every man is entitled to his own view in that matter and we here in this Chamber are supposed to represent the views of the people who sent us here, and if we back down from their views and give votes contrary to the feelings of the people how does our conscience stand after that? I think, Sir, that as an honourable man you (the President) ought to stand down and not to vote away the lives of the people of Ireland. I think you have a grave responsibility before you and every man of you. The delegates were sent across to England, they were placed in a very awkward position, and I think instead of pillorying them here now you ought to congratulate them on the magnificent fight that they made under the circumstances. Now there is talk of reality and shadow-chasing. This document of President de Valera's is like looking for a bit of glow in the rainbow, but when you look for the rainbow you won't find the glow.
Is mairg a bhíonn go hole agus a bhíonn bocht na dhiaidh. And does any man say here that if you put this document of President de Valera's before the people of England it would be accepted in its entirety? I say there is not a man, woman or child who would believe you.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER THE DEPUTY SPEAKER
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER: I would like to remind you to speak as short as possible. I don't like to restrict time but as there are a great many Deputies who probably wish to speak it would be well if each Deputy would speak as briefly as possible.
MR. SEÁN MACENTEE MR. SEÁN MACENTEE
MR. SEÁN MACENTEE: I am in rather a difficulty in rising to speak now and I thought in view of the indefinite state we left the discussion this morning that we would have to consider the documents which were placed before us and to see how far they were relevant to the matter under discussion. If I tried to deal with that issue now I must necessarily restrict myself and the time of the other delegates in dealing with the Treaty itself, but since the delegate or the Deputy from Galway who has just sat down has made a reference to this document it might be no harm if I tried to place the discussion which has opened very informally and so inert and so inadequate, upon something [198] like a proper basis in regard to those documents. Those documents are very relevant and very pertinent to this issue. They are relevant, are pertinent to it in this way, because it is those documents that are to determine whether the Cabinet of the Dáil, irrespective of what the Dáil itself may do—and I hope if the Dáil Cabinet were to go wrong in this matter that there would be still left in this Assembly sufficient intelligence and strength of character to reject that Treaty upon grounds which I hope in time to have an opportunity of placing before you. These documents I say are relevant to this issue, whether the Cabinet is bound to honour the signature of the delegates or plenipotentiaries, to give them their proper title. There are those documents. Out of the mass of documents there are three that are pertinent to the discussion. First of all there is the fundamental document—a document from which all the delegates' actions and powers issue—the copy of the instructions to the plenipotentiaries. And the most important clause in that document is clause 3 of it which says, “It is also understood that the completed text of the draft treaty about to be signed will be similarly submitted to Dublin and reply awaited.” Now, Sir, that was not done and I think it has never been held by any person in this Assembly that the complete final draft of the Treaty was submitted to the Dáil Cabinet. There may have been a semi-final draft, but what is here nominated in that form is the final draft and that was not submitted. When it was not submitted the Cabinet cannot be in honour bound to honour the signature of the delegation. They may not be bound in the letter some might say, but it might possibly happen that they might be bound in the spirit and if they were I should say that in order to secure unanimity in this Dáil it might be a good thing for the Cabinet to consider whether they might not adopt the Treaty. But there are two other documents which we have to weigh and consider in order to decide how we shall stand upon that question. The first of these documents are the records of the secretary of the Cabinet. Those records may be a fair record but I ask you to remember this that they are necessarily not records. There is not one member of the Cabinet who has pledged himself by his signature that these are absolutely and exactly accurate minutes of what happened at these meetings. The great point that has been made is in regard to a certain oath. In connection with that oath I ask you also to consider the memorandum which was prepared, I believe, by the Minister of Economic Affairs at the instance of the chairman of the delegation. That memorandum purports I believe— and I am subject to correction if I have gathered a wrong impression—to express as definitely as it is possible to express it the collective impression of the delegation as to what were the views of the Cabinet upon the proposals that have been set before them—what were the views of the Cabinet as to the proposals which they wished to be laid before the British plenipotentiaries. Now, Sir, there is here in this document an oath which appears in exactly the same form to that which was recorded in the secretary's minutes and we have already heard that that oath is included in the document which is entitled, “Amendments by the Irish Representatives to the Proposed Articles of Agreement.” The oath as included in that document is only one of three drafts which were if you like not exactly laid before the Cabinet but, if they were laid, certainly not discussed and accepted as the final and considered views of the Cabinet upon the matter. But that oath appeared as part and parcel of other essential conditions, other essential clauses, which qualify every word of that oath, and that oath must be taken in context with that and cannot be taken apart and considered apart from that. Those, Sir, represent, I dare say, represent the view of that what has transpired today of one section of the delegation as to what were the Cabinet's views upon the matter; the draft treaty represents the views of the other section of the delegation as to what were the Cabinet's views upon the matter. Now, Sir, in so serious a matter as this and particularly in view of this written instruction which governed every action, I of [sic] the delegation itself was not unanimous in its view as to what were the decisions of the Cabinet that Saturday afternoon. And I say that lacking that unanimity of impression they are not entitled now—and mark my words— to sign any treaty, much less to come back here and demand as a right that the Cabinet of the Dáil should accept it. I don't say that in the very, very difficult position in which they were placed [199] they had not certain rights. They had the right to exercise their own discretion. They had the right to append their signature to that document upon their own responsibility but then they had a right—the only right they have in the House as I contended—first to come back and submit it here before the Dáil not as the instrument of the Cabinet, not as an instrument which the Cabinet is bound in honour to accept, but as an instrument which the Cabinet may consider and reject and would ask this House to reject if it so thinks fit. Now, Sir, I am afraid I shall have to deal a little longer in view of the fact that I have to try to deal with this document, and I will have to take up a little more of the time of this Assembly than I wish today, but I am going, if I may here in private, to give you the reasons why I am against this Treaty. I do not wish that anything I should say should hurt anyone here. I may say hard things about the Treaty but I do not wish —and I could not if I did—to say one hard thing about those who have signed it because it is not in my power to say it. In this matter every man must be a conscience unto himself and every man must act true to the truth as he sees it, but I say this, that everything connected with this Treaty shows that the delegates were hurried to the signing of it. In the short space of about 17 hours it was conceived, adjusted, written and signed. They were sleepless, travel-worn and care-worn men. Whatever the consequences of this Treaty —and I believe they will be very consequences [sic] indeed—the verdict of the future, when the extenuating facts are known, will indemnify the delegates, but as regards ourselves it is a very, very different case. We have time to consider. We have had time to take counsel. What we do now we do after grave and weighty deliberation and, from the consequences of our act, for us there will be no relief. I cannot think, I cannot believe, that when such consideration as that is placed before you—men who have by their devotion, by their suffering, by their valour, honoured by a glorious place in our country's history—I cannot believe that when such consideration as that is laid before them, that they will not weigh carefully every word of that document, search every clause, examine every clause and when honour and expediency conflict let honour triumph and thus remain steadfast and true for ever, the dauntless guardians of this nation's soil. It happened that last night, stung by a reference which the Assistant Minister for Local Government made to our President, I interjected, in the course of a very cutting and incisive speech, which, if he will permit me to say, made me think that the mantle of a distinguished relative of his who has played his part in Irish history—
MR. KEVIN O'HIGGINS MR. KEVIN O'HIGGINS
MR. KEVIN O'HIGGINS: On a point of personal explanation, I am not a relative of Mr. Healy's.
DEPUTY SPEAKER DEPUTY SPEAKER
DEPUTY SPEAKER: This has nothing whatever to do with the matter before the House.
MR. MACENTEE MR. MACENTEE
MR. MACENTEE: I only wish—
MR. O'HIGGINS MR. O'HIGGINS
MR. O'HIGGINS: I was not alive when Mr. Healy married my aunt.
MR. MACENTEE MR. MACENTEE
MR. MACENTEE: If you will permit me in the best of good humour to say so, I must say that I am very very sorry that he was not alive when Mr. Healy married his aunt, otherwise he might not be here now. However, as I was going to say, stung by a reference which the Assistant Minister for Local Government made to our President I interjected a remark. That remark I freely admit was in the very worst of bad taste. I know it had absolutely no relevance to any gentleman here. I don't believe that any member of this Dáil, and I wish therefore most sincerely to express regret and to apologise for it. But Sir, when I made that remark—and perhaps it was a fitting punishment for me—the member who was speaking spat out one word, “reminiscences”. And some members here thought themselves fit to take it up and cast it in my face. Well that word did awaken recollections in my mind. I remember some years ago, when a rash and impulsive boy, I applied for a commission in the British army. There are other men who held that commission who thought they were doing the best for Ireland. Something, however, made me withdraw my application. It was afterwards produced at my courtmartial and it was one of the most damning testimonies they brought against me because the construction placed on it was that I applied for it in order to be a spy in the ranks.
MR. O'KEEFFE MR. O'KEEFFE
MR. O'KEEFFE: We are not trying [200] Mr. MacEntee for anything he did for the last 20 years.
DEPUTY SPEAKER DEPUTY SPEAKER
DEPUTY SPEAKER: I am afraid he is wandering from the point.
MR. MACENTEE MR. MACENTEE
MR. MACENTEE: If you will permit me to develop this in my own way. If a man is insulted to his face may he not have the right of reply? Is there one here who will take the same attitude towards me? Sir, something happened to change my course. I therefore threw myself into the Volunteers and I served very loyally there. There is a Deputy in this House who will tell you that with his brother I worked day and night in that corps. When a certain document was published countermanding mobilisation for the King [recte Rising] I rode from Dundalk to Dublin and saw the first President of the Irish Republic, received his orders and left Dublin at five minutes past twelve on Easter Monday, got to my men three miles from Dundalk and brought them out. And when our petrol ran out my men got through the enemy's lines, got into Earl Street, into the Post Office, left the Post Office under the order—
MR. DAN MCCARTHY MR. DAN MCCARTHY
MR. DAN MCCARTHY: On a point of order. If we are going to have the history of the action of every man since 1916 we will be here until tomorrow morning.
MR. MACENTEE MR. MACENTEE
MR. MACENTEE: I say it is relevant and I will show you the relevancy in a moment. I change my course and find myself inside the enemy's lines in Dublin—
DEPUTY SPEAKER DEPUTY SPEAKER
DEPUTY SPEAKER: I fear I cannot allow the Deputy to continue in that strain. It has nothing to do with the subject.
MR. MACENTEE MR. MACENTEE
MR. MACENTEE: It has. I tell you it has.
DEPUTY SPEAKER DEPUTY SPEAKER
DEPUTY SPEAKER: Is it the wish of the House that he continue?
SEVERAL MEMBERS SEVERAL MEMBERS
SEVERAL MEMBERS: Yes.
MR. MACENTEE MR. MACENTEE
MR. MACENTEE: If some people will not have enough patience to hear me speak for the first time really on this question, well then it is not worth while considering the position of the country at all. I left that Post Office under the O'Rahilly's orders. I was second last in the file entering Moore Street. I rallied my men there, put a house into a position of defence and prepared to stand then, as I am prepared to stand now, for the cause of Ireland and the Republic. That was a significant change in the space of six years, and when the word “reminiscences” is spitten at me memories like that rise up to me and make me say, “Well no man can say that I am not worthy to be a member of this Dáil and to speak in this matter and put my views before you.” Now I said I would show you the relevancy of this matter later. What was it changed me about 1914? It was simply this, that Redmond in 1914 asked us to join an Irish Brigade in order that we might secure the unity of our country. When it was apparent that Redmond was about to be betrayed and that England was going through with its policy of Partition, seeing that touchstone of national unity, much nobler men, greater men, inspired me. I saw where my duty lay and, as I decided upon John Redmond's policy by this touchstone of the national unity, so I test and condemn Mr. Griffith's policy now. There are two problems with which those who try to serve their country are always faced. The first and the transcendental problem if you like is how to secure her national independence, but there is another, and I have held always that it comes first in point of time, and that is how to secure her national union. Men may differ from me that it is not a question of principle at all but a question of expediency. I, Sir, contend that you will never have by the very fact of it an independent nation until you have secured a united nation upon honourable terms. It was said the other day—yesterday—by a very eminent member of the House that he was an opportunist. So am I an opportunist who tries to serve his principles and to seize opportunities to serve and not to subvert his principles. I saw in this conference an opportunity not to secure a Republic, or even to secure Home Rule, but an opportunity to secure the union of the Irish nation. I was a strong supporter of the conference from the first. I said many things about the conference but no one can say I ever said I would accept anything from that conference that did not bring Irish union. That was to be my test. I would not have taken the oath of allegiance to the Assembly to act otherwise. They say they did support it in order to obtain [201] Irish union. I said I would never sit in an Assembly based on that conference if it entailed an oath of allegiance to the English King, and this conference and these proposals have secured neither Irish independence nor Irish union. So far from securing independence if it lies in the hearts of men in this generation to make this glorious achievement impossible—
MR. COLLIVET MR. COLLIVET
MR. COLLIVET: He is speaking on the main line of the Treaty and we will be getting confused—now on the genesis of the Treaty and then on the Treaty itself. If this is to continue we will be here for a fortnight.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER THE DEPUTY SPEAKER
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER: I understood that private members were to express their views on the general situation.
MR. SEÁN MACENTEE MR. SEÁN MACENTEE
MR. SEÁN MACENTEE: I am against the proposal because I believe article 12 of the Treaty, so far from securing Irish union, makes it for ever impossible to obtain it. There are many grounds on which I might base an objection but I refer you to a speech of the Prime Minister of England on Wednesday afternoon. In that he said, in reference to article 12, that they considered and that the friends of Ulster thought it desirable that if Ulster was to remain a separate unit it was desirable that some alteration should be made in her boundaries, and he went on to define what in his view the alteration should be. He said it would be to remove from under her jurisdiction certain people and districts over which the Government of Northern Ireland can never rule and substitute for them certain other districts, Monaghan, Cavan and Donegal. That is what is meant to Ulster delegates—certain other districts over which a new Order in Parliament can be made effective and which will give to the Northern Parliament a population which is essential in order that here should be planted or established in Ireland a second race and people who will be the inveterate and relentless enemy of the indigenous nation. I heard the remark. “Nonsense”. Let him who made that remark refer to the debates in the House of Commons and he will see plainly stated in article 12, if it is accepted by this nation, can be done in the spirit of the man who is forcing the Treaty on us and can also force his interpretation on us. If that is to be interpreted in Lloyd George's spirit, and it will be so interpreted, we are going to erect in Ulster, and we are going to give to the Ulster people the title deeds for a fortress of Orangeism and Unionism that will hold Ireland for England as surely as Gibraltar holds the Mediterranean for them. And that is my great objection to this Treaty. I ask you to consider and weigh it. We have been told in this House that there is a certain element which was not represented here. The eminent gentleman who occupied the Chair had taken that as his especial charge. I wish to speak of the same elements but with a closer intimacy with their real views on this matter. I was born and lived in Belfast until six months ago. Do the people of Belfast and those six counties know the real object and purpose of this Treaty? I don't say, mind you, that it is the purpose of the chairman of the delegation, but it is the purpose of the men who fashioned this Treaty and wrote the draft of it, the English Prime Minister, that man who said they could not deal with the Irish situation until Ireland was faced with the accomplished rights of Ulster, and that man who kept this country in a swelter of blood and suffering for the last eighteen months, when long ago public opinion in England was ripe for a settlement, in order that he might set up an Ulster fortress. That, Treaty or no Treaty, is going to bind Ireland to England forever. I speak for the people near Belfast and if they knew the inwardness of that Treaty, no matter what you in Ireland would do, there would come from them a cry that you might save them. Reject the Treaty for ever, not to save the people of Belfast, but your own country w